

mature thoughts, οὐκ ἔστι ζῆν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κενῷ θεῶν καὶ κενῷ προνοίας, *it is not worth the while to live in a world empty of God and Providence*, is the sense of all those that know what a Deity means. Indeed it were the greatest unhappiness that might be, to have been born into such a

5 world, where we should be perpetually tossed up and down by a rude and blind Fortune, and be perpetually liable to all those abuses which the savage Lusts and Passions of the world would put upon us. It is not possible for any thing well to bear up the spirit of that man that shall calmly meditate with himself the true state and condition of this world, should that

10 Mind and Wisedome be taken away from it which governs every part of it, and overrules all those disorders that at any time begin to break forth in it. Were there not an *Omniscient* skill to temper, and fitly to rank up in their due places all those quarrelsome and extravagant spirits that are in the world, it would soon prove an *unhabitable* place, and sink under the

15 heavy weight of it's own confusion; which was wittily signified in that Fable of *Phæton*, who being admitted to drive the chariot of the Sun but for one day, by his rude and unskilfull guidance of it made it fall down, and burn the world. Remove *God* and *Providence* out of the world, and then we have nothing to depend upon but *Chance* and *Fortune*, the *Humours* and

20 *Passions* of men; and he that could then live in it, had need be as blind as these Lords would be, that he might not see his own misery alwaies staring upon him; and had need be more senseless and stupid, that he might not be affected with it.

4

1 οὐκ ἔστι ζῆν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κενῷ θεῶν καὶ κενῷ προνοίας] adapted from Marcus Aurelius, *de seipso*, 2.11.1: “what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of Providence?” cf. “without God and without providence, there is no living in the world” Whichcote, *Works*, IV, p. 354.

15–16 that Fable of *Phæton*] The “fable” is related in *Timæus*, 22c: “There is a story, which even you have preserved, that once upon a time Phaethon, the son of Helios, having yoked the steeds in his father’s chariot, because he was not able to drive them in the path of his father, burnt up all that was upon the earth, and was himself destroyed by a thunderbolt.” Smith, it should be noted, reads the “fable” through Plato’s interpretation of it, that it signified “a declination of the bodies moving in the heavens around the earth, and a great conflagration of things upon the earth, which recurs after long intervals.”

4 Having finish'd our two short Discourses concerning those two *Anti-Deities*, viz. *Superstition* and *Atheism*; we shall now proceed to discourse more largely concerning the main Heads and Principles of Religion.

And here we are to take Notice of those two Cardinal points which the
 5 Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* makes the necessary Foundations
 of all Religion, viz. *That God is*, and *That He is a rewarder of them that seek him*. To which we should add, *The Immortality of of the Reasonable Soul*, but that that may seem included in the former: and indeed we can
 10 neither believe any *Invisible reward* of which he there speaks, without
 a *Prolepsis* of the *Soul's Immortality*; neither can we entertain a serious
 belief of that, but the notions of *Pœna* and *Præmium* will naturally follow
 from it; we never meet with any who were perswaded of the former, that
 ever doubted of the latter: and therefore the former two have been usu-
 ally taken alone for the First principles of Religion, and have been most
 15 insisted upon by the *Platonists*; and accordingly a novel Platonist writing
 a summary of *Plato's Divinity* intitles his book, *De Deo & Imortalitate An-
 imæ*. And also the *Stoical Philosophy* requires a belief of these as the

6–7 viz. *That God is*, and *That He is a rewarder of them that seek him*] Hebrews 11, 6: “But without faith it is impossible to please him: for hee that commeth to God, must beleuee that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seeke him.” cf. Pauley, *The Candle of the Lord*, p.71; cf. Worthington, *Select Discourses*, pp. 155, 418.
 11 *Pœna* and *Præmium*] reward and punishment.

1 4] This marks the start of Worthington's *Fourth Discourse*.

5 Author of the Epistle] Traditionally ascribed to St Paul.

10 *Prolepsis* of the *Soul's Immortality*] Stillingfleet agreed that “The existence of God and immortality of the soul, both of which seem to be supposed as general Prolepses in the writings of Moses”, were fundamentals of religion (Stillingfleet, *Origines Sacrae: or A Rational Account of the Christian Faith*, p.244.)

15–17 a novel Platonist writing a summary of *Plato's Divinity* intitles his book, *De Deo & Imortalitate Animæ*] The work in question has not been identified. Nicholas de Nancel's *tractatus de deo et immortalitate animae; et de sede animae in corpore* (in Nancel, *Analogia microcosmi ad macrocosmon; id est, relatio et proportio vniuersi ad hominem*) offers an intriguing possibility, but is hardly “a summary of *Plato's Divinity*”, any more than Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophiae, in quibus Dei existentia, et animae humanae a corpore distinctio, demonstrantur*. (Smith's 1641 copy is in Queens' library.) Ficino's *Theologia platonica de immortalitate animae* might seem a closer match, but hardly seems the work of a “novel Platonist”, except in the very long term. It was published in 1482.

Prolepses of all Religion, of the one whereof *Epictetus* himself assures us, ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον, &c. *Know that the main Foundation of Piety is this, to have ὁρμὰς ὑπολήψεις right opinions and apprehensions of God, viz. That he is, and that he governs all things καλῶς καὶ δικαίως.* And the other
 5 is sufficiently insinuated in that Cardinal distinction of their τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, and τὰ μὴ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, and is more fully express’d by *Simplicius*. For however the *Stoicks* may seem to lay some ground of suspicion, as if they were dubi-
 10 ous in this point, yet I think that which *Tully* and others deliver concerning their opinion herein, may fully answer all scruples, viz. That as they made certain *Vicissitudes* of *Conflagrations* and *Inundations* whereby the World should perish in certain *periods* of time ; so they thought the Souls of men should also be subject to these *periodical revolutions*; and therefore though they were of themselves immortal, should in these changes fall under the power of the common fate.

15 And indeed we scarce ever find that any were deem’d *Religious*, that did not own these two *Fundamentals*. For the *Sadducees*, the Jewish Writers are wont commonly to reckon them among the *Epicureans*, because though they held a God, yet they denied the *Immortality* of mens

2 ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον] “know that the important thing”, from *Encheiridion*, 31.

3 ὁρμὰς ὑπολήψεις] “right notions”

4 καλῶς καὶ δικαίως] “noble and just”; Smith is summarising *Epictetus’ Encheiridion*, 31: “Be assured that the essence of piety towards the gods lies in this, to form right opinions concerning them, as existing, and as governing the universe justly and well.”

5 τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν] “things within our control”

6 τὰ μὴ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν] “things beyond our control”; citeWolf1640, p.7.

6 *Simplicius*] The distinction is made at the very start of *Epictetus’ Encheiridion*. *Simplicius’* exposition of the chapter derives the whole validity of his moral system from this distinction made by *Epictetus*. The tenour of his remarks is not unlike *Smith’s*. See *Brittain and Brennan, Simplicius: On Epictetus Handbook 1-26*, pp.40ff.

8 *Tully*] in *Academica*, II, 38, 119, for example.

10–11 certain *Vicissitudes* of *Conflagrations* and *Inundations* whereby the World should perish in certain *periods* of time] The *Stoics* doctrine of *ekpyrosis* was perhaps “the most notorious of all their cosmological theories”; cf. *J.M. Rist (ed) The Stoics*, (University of California, 1978), pp.180ff.

16–17 the Jewish Writers are wont commonly to reckon them among the *Epicureans*] as, for example, *Josephus*; cf. *Worthington, Select Discourses*, pp.408-11; for a modern discussion of the issue, see *L.V. Semenchenko*, “Were the *Sadducees* *Epicureans*? The problem of interrelation of fate, providence and free will in the works of *Flavius Josephus*”, *Vestnik drevnej istorii*, 2005 (3), pp. 125-142.

Souls, which the New Testament seems to include, if not especially to aim at, in imputing to them a denial of the Resurrection; which is therefore more fully explained in the *Acts*, where it is added that they held there was *neither Angel nor Spirit*. And these two Principles are chiefly aimed at in those two Inscriptions upon the Temple at *Delphos*, the one, EI, referring to God, by which Title those that came in to worship were supposed to invoke him, acknowledging his Immutable and Eternal nature; the other, ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ, as the admonition of the Deity again to all his worshippers, to take notice of the dignity and Immortality of their own Souls, as *Plutarch* and *Tully*, as also *Clemens Alexandr.* expound them.

3 *Acts*] Acts 2, 23, 8: "For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit: but the Pharisees confess both." cf. Worthington, *Select Discourses*, pp.402-5.

5 EI] "Thou art"

8 ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ] "Know thyself"

5 the Temple at *Delphos*] The temple at Delphi was dedicated to Apollo, and, from 776 BC, the location of the Pythian games.

10 *Plutarch*] Amongst the interpretations in Plutarch's *DE E apud Delphos* is that by Ammonius at 392a; he summarises the complex relationship between the two inscriptions: "the one is an utterance addressed in awe and reverence to the god as existent through all eternity, the other is a reminder to mortal man of his own nature, and the weaknesses that beset him" (394c).

10 *Tully*] For example: "this, doubtless, is the meaning of the precept of Apollo, which advises every one to know himself. For I do not apprehend the meaning of the God to have been that we should understand our members, our stature, and form; for we are not merely bodies; nor, when I say these things to you, am I addressing myself to your body: when, therefore, he says, 'Know yourself,' he says this, 'Inform yourself of the nature of your soul;' for the body is but a kind of vessel, or receptacle of the soul, and whatever your soul does is your own act" (*Tusculanae disputationes*, I.22; cf. V.25).

10 *Clemens Alexandr*] Titus Flavius Clemens (c.150 - c.215 AD) was known as Clemens Alexandrinus (Clement of Alexandria), because he taught at the Catechetical School there. In his *Stromata* or "Miscellanies", he adduced the inscriptions as example of "divine things wrapped up in figures": "Similarly also the maxim 'Know thyself' shows many things; both that thou art mortal, and that thou wast born a human being; and also that, in comparison with the other excellences of life, thou art of no account, because thou sayest that thou art rich or renowned; or, on the other hand, that, being rich or renowned, you are not honoured on account of your advantages alone. And it says, Know for what thou wert born, and whose image thou art; and what is thy essence, and what thy creation, and what thy relation to God, and the like" (V.4). All the interpretations alluded to are broadly consonant with the Platonic view, as for example, in *Phaedrus*, 229e and *Charmides*, 164d ff.

But if we will have the Fundamental Articles of Christian Religion, we must add to the former, *The Communication of God to Mankind through Christ*; which last the Scripture treats of at large, so far as concerns our *practice*, with that plainness and simplicity, that I cannot but think, that
 5 whosoever shall ingenuously and with humility of Spirit addressing himself to God, converse therewith, will see the bright beams of Divinity shining forth in it, and it may be find the Text it self much plainer then all those Glosses that have been put upon it; though it may be it is not so clear in matters of *Speculation*, as some Magisterial men are apt to think it is.

10 Now for these three Articles of *Faith* and *Practice*, I think if we duly consider the Scriptures, or the Reason of the thing it self, we shall easily find all Practical Religion to be referr'd to them, and built upon them: *The Nature of God and of our own Immortal Souls* both shew us what our Religion should be, and also the Necessity of it; and the Doctrine of
 15 *Free grace in Christ*, the sweet and comfortable means of attaining to that perfection and Blessedness which the other Belief teaches us to aime at.

In pursuing of these we shall first begin with *The Immortality of the Soul*, which if it be once cleared, we can neither leave any room for *Atheism* (which those I doubt are not ordinarily very free from that have gross
 20 material notions of their own Souls) nor be wholly ignorant what God is: for indeed the chief natural way whereby we can climb up to the understanding of the Deity is by a Contemplation of our own Souls. We cannot think of him but according to the measure and model of our own Intellect, or frame any other *Idea* of him then what the impressions of our own Souls
 25 will permit us: and therefore the best Philosophers have alwaies taught us to inquire for God within ourselves; *Reason in us*, as *Tully* tells us, being

15 sweet and comfortable] cf. the argument to the Song of Solomon in the Geneva Bible (1599); "Solomon by most sweet and comfortable allegories and parables describeth the perfect love of Jesus Christ"

21-22 the chief natural way whereby we can climb up to the understanding of the Deity is by a Contemplation of our own Souls] cf. the language of Whichcote: "A holy understanding climbs up to God by contemplation, meditation and motion of heavenly affection, as to the image and some resemblance of God; climbing up by steps to behold God, the original and the fountain of all happiness." (Whichcote, *Several Discourses*, IV, p.300).

- participata similitudo rationis internae*: and accordingly some good Expositours have interpreted that place in S. John's Gospel chap.I. *He is that true light which enlightens everyman that cometh into the world*; which if I were to gloss upon in the language of the Platonists, I should doe it thus,
- 5 λόγος ἐστὶ φῶς ψυχῶν, *the Eternal Word is the light of Souls*, which the Vulgar Latine referr'd to in *Signatum est supra nos lumen vultus tui, Domine*, as *Aquinas* observes. But we shall not search into the full nature of the Soul, but rather make our inquiry into the Immortality of it, and endeavour to demonstrate that.
- 10 But before we fall more closely upon this, *viz.* the demonstrating the Soul's *Immortality*, we shall premise three things.

I. *That the Immortality of the Soul doth not absolutely need any Demon-*

1 *participata similitudo rationis internae*] HGW and CAP identify the source not as Cicero, but St Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*, I.84.5: "ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae" ("for the intellectual light in us is noting more than a participating likeness of the increated light in which the divine ideas are contained"). HGW silently emended "internae" to "eternae". The quotation is re-used below, page XXX.

2–3 *He is that true light which enlightens everyman that cometh into the world*] John, 1,9: "That was the true light, which lighteth euery man that commeth into the world." cf. Andrewes, *Ninety Six Sermons*, V, p.319 for a suggestive identification of this light with "the candle of the lord".

5 λόγος ἐστὶ φῶς ψυχῶν] "the word is the light of souls"; probably Smith's own coinage, perhaps recalling the Greek of John 1,4.: "In him was life, and the life was the light of men(το φως των ανθρωπων)."

6 *Signatum est supra nos lumen vultus tui, Domine*] "The light of your face is stamped upon us"; the text is that of the Clementine Vulgate for Psalms 4,6.

7 *Aquinas* observes] Again in *Summa Theologica*, I.84.5: "it is written (Psalm 4, 6-7), *Many say: who will give us sight of happiness?* and the Psalmist replies to the questions, *The light of your face, lord, is signed upon us, as if to say, by the seal of the divine light in us every thing is made known to us.*" cf. Whichcote's citation of the verse in Whichcote, *Several Discourses*, IV, p.303. and Ficino's in *Theologia Platonica*, XII.4.2. cf. also Culverwel, *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature*, p.51.

9 demonstrate] in the sense of setting out "a Chain of Arguments depending one on the other, and founded primarily on first and self evident Principles; ending in the invincible Proof of a thing to be demonstrated." Blount, *Glossographia*.

stration to clear it by, but might be assumed rather as a Principle or Postulatum seeing the notion of it is apt naturally to insinuate it self into the belief of the most vulgar sort of men. Mens understandings commonly lead them as readily to believe that their *Souls* are *Immortal*, as that they
 5 have any Existence at all. And though they be not all so wise and Logical, as to distinguish aright between their *Souls* and their *Bodies*, or tell what kind of thing that is that they commonly call their *Soul*; yet they are strongly inclined to believe that some part of them shall survive another, and that that Soul, which it may be they conceive by a gross Phantasm,
 10 shall live, when the other more visible part of them shall moulder into dust. And therefore *all Nations* have consented in this belief, which hath almost been as vulgarly received as the belief of a Deity; as a diligent converse with History will assure us, it having been never so much questioned by the Idiotical sort of men, as by some unskilful Philosophers, who have had
 15 Wit & Fancy enough to raise doubts, like Evil Spirits, but not Judgement enough to send them down again.

This *Consensus Gentium Tully* thinks enough to conclude a Law and Maxim of Nature by, which though I should not universally grant, seeing sometimes Error and Superstition may strongly plead this Argument; yet
 20 I think for those things that are the matter of our *first* belief, that Notion may not be refuted. For we cannot easily conceive how any *Prime no-*

1–2 Postulatum] “*Postulates*, in Mathematicks, are such easie and self-evident suppositions as need no Explication or Illustration to render them intelligible,” says Blount, *Glossographia*.

17 *Consensus Gentium*] “agreement of everyone”

1–2 Postulatum] Here, recalling Descartes’ use of “principles” as the basis of reasoning, particularly in *Principia philosophiae*, Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*.

14 Idiotical] In the sense of “unlearned”; cf. Blount, *Glossographia*.

17–18 *Tully* thinks enough to conclude a Law and Maxim of Nature by] Probably reflecting *Tusculanae disputationes*, I.13: “in every case the consent of all nations is to be looked upon a law of nature”; cf. *de natura deorum*, I.17: “a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true”. Smith’s position on the *consensus gentium* may be viewed in the light of H.G. Van Leuwen, *The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630-1690* (The Hague, 1963).

21–1 *Prime notion*] Recalling Descartes’ assertion that “The mind also discovers certain common notions out of which it frames various demonstrations that carry conviction to such a degree as to render doubt of their truth impossible, so long as we give attention to them.” Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, 1.13, p.5.

tion that hath no dependency on any other antecedent to it, should be generally entertain'd; did not the common dictate of Nature or Reason acting alike in all men move them to conspire together in the embracing of it, though they knew not one anothers minds. And this it may be might
 5 first persuade *Averroes* to think of a *Common Intellect*, because of the uniform judgements of men in some things. But indeed in those Notions which we may call *notiones ortæ*, there a *communis notitia* is not so free from all suspicion; which may be cleared by taking an Instance from our present Argument. The notion of the *Immortality* of the Soul is such an
 10 one as is generally owned by all those that yet are not able to collect it by a long *Series* and concatenation of sensible observation, and by a Logical dependence of one thing upon another deduce it from sensible Experiments; a thing that it may be was scarce ever done by the wisest Philosophers, but is rather believed with a kind of repugnancy to Sense,
 15 which shews all things to be mortal, and which would have been too apt to have deluded the ruder sort of men, did not a more powerful impression upon their own Souls forcibly urge them to believe their own Immortality. Though indeed if the common notions of men were well examined, it may be some common notion adherent to this of the *Immortality* may be as
 20 generally received, which yet in it self is false; and that by reason of a

28 *notiones ortæ*] "ideas that arise"

28 *communis notitia*] "common idea"

26 *Averroes*] Abū l-Walīd Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Rušd (1126-1198), the famous Arab philosopher, was a native of Cordoba, whose influence extended to the seventeenth century through his Commentaries, mainly on Aristotle. The commonly held opinion that he denied the personal immortality of the soul was a decisive factor in determining the Cambridge Platonists' view of him. See Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance*, pp.133-143, and Sarah Hutton, "The Cambridge Platonists and Averroes" in Akasoy and Giglioni, *Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe*, pp.197 - 211.

26 *Common Intellect*] See St. Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, for the account which lies behind the Cambridge Platonists' understanding of the theory. cf. also *Enneads*, IV.9.

32-34 a long *Series* ... from sensible Experiments] Smith's language here reflects Cartesian thinking about the ability of the mind to perceive it self, and to construct a reliable chain of reasoning on clear perceived observations.

41-3 by reason of a common prejudice ... with their own Souls] cf. Descartes: "in our early years, the mind was so immersed in the body, that ... it yet knew nothing distinctly; and ... numerous prejudices were then contracted" (Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, 1. 47, p.17.

common prejudice which the earthly and Sensual part of man will equally
 possesse all men with, untill they come to be well acquainted with their
 own Souls; as namely a notion of the Souls *Materiality*, and it may be
 it's *Traduction* too, which seems to be as generally received by the vul-
 5 gar sort as the former. But the reasons of that is evident, for the Souls
 of men exercising themselves first of all κινήσει πρόβατικῇ, as the Greek
 Philosopher expresseth, meerly by a *Progressive kind of motion*, spend-
 ing themselves about Bodily and Material acts, and conversing onely with
 Sensible things; they are apt to acquire such deep stamps of Material
 10 phantasms to themselves, that they cannot imagine their own Being to
 be any other than *Material & Divisible*, though of a fine Æthereal nature:
 which kind of conceit, though it be inconsistent with an Immortal and In-
 corruptible nature, yet hath had too much prevalencie in Philosophers
 themselves, their Minds not being sufficiently abstracted while they have
 15 contemplated the highest Being of all. And some think *Aristotle* himself
 cannot be excused in this point, who seems to have thought God himself
 to be nothing else but μέγα ζῶον, as he styles him. But such Common

47 κινήσει πρόβατικῇ] “sheeplike movement”

58 μέγα ζῶον] “great animal”

44 a notion of the Souls *Materiality*] The most famous proponent of the material soul, Hobbes, published *Leviathan* in April or May 1651. For his thinking, see Hobbes, *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill*. Chapter 46.

45 *Traduction*] “transmission by generation, descent”; cf. Culverwel, *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature*, p.78: “I find the *Stoicks* challenged for this *Error*, that they thought there was a *real emanation*, and *traduction* of the *Soul* out of God, *ex ipsa Dei substantia*.”

47–48 the Greek Philosopher] The phrase usually identifies Plotinus, but κινήσει πρόβατικῇ occurs nowhere in the *Enneads*. Perhaps Smith mis-recalls κινήσει μεταβατικῇ, “movement from place to place” from *Enneads*, III.7.11. The linear motion is to be opposed to that more fruitful circular motion of the following page. Cudworth explicitly recognised just such a contrast: “Sense is like a line which is the Flux of a Point running out from it self, but Intellect like a Circle that keeps within it self.” Cudworth, *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, p.98.

58 μέγα ζῶον] The phrase is not Aristotle’s, nor does Smith do justice to Aristotle’s ideas, presumably in *de anima* 2.2. 414a. For Cudworth’s very different uses of the phrase, see Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, pp.270, 304, 499, 537, 561 etc.

58–2 But such Common Notions as these are, arising from the deceptions and hallucinations of *Sense*] The implication is that Aristotle failed adequately to practise his own

Notions as these are, arising from the deceptions and hallucinations of *Sense*, ought not to prejudice those which are not *Sense*, but some *Higher power* begets in all men. And so we have done with that.

The second thing I should premise should be in place of a *Postulatum* to our following Demonstrations, or rather a *Caution* about them, which is, *That, to a right conceiving the force of any such Arguments as may prove the Souls Immortality, there must be an antecedent Converse with our own Souls*. It is no hard matter to convince any one by clear and evident principles, fetch'd from his own sense of himself, who hath ever well meditated the *Powers* and *Operations* of his own Soul, that it is *Immaterial* and *Immortal*.

But those very Arguments that to such will be Demonstrative, to others will lose something of the strength of Probability: For indeed it is not possible for us well to know what our Souls are, but onely by their κινήσεις κυκλικαί, their *Circular and Reflex motions*, and Converse with themselves, which onely can steal from them their own secrets. All those Discourses which have been written of the Soul's Heraldry, will not blazon it so well to us as it self will doe. When we turn our own eyes in upon it, it will soon tell us it's own royal pedigree and noble extraction, by those sacred Hieroglyphicks which it bears upon it self. We shall endeavour to interpret and unfold some of them in our following Discourse.

72–73 κινήσεις κυκλικαί] “circular movements”

method of *aphairesis*.

66–67 clear and evident principles, fetch'd from his own sense of himself] cf. Descartes' famous argument in *Meditationes de prima philosophia, in qua Dei existentia et animæ immortalitas demonstratur*, (Paris, 1641), III, 2.

72–73 κινήσεις κυκλικαί] Again, the phrase is not from Plotinus. Smith may recall Pseudo-Plutarch's summary of Aristotle's ideas, (in *de placitis philosophorum*, 887d, but the closest parallel is perhaps Pseudo-Dionysius' claim that Ψυχῆς δὲ κίνησις ἐστὶ κυκλική - “the movement of the soul is also circular” *de divinis nominibus*, IV.9. 4b. If the phrase is Smith's own coinage, it doubtless glances at the discussion of the soul's movement in Aristotle's *de anima*, 407a-b.

75 blazon] “to express or display the Parts of a Coat of Arms in proper Colours and Metals. Also to set forth one's good or all Qualities” Blount, *Glossographia*; here, to provide a formal, analytical account. The metaphor continues in the sentence following

3. There is one thing more to be considered, which may serve as a common *Basis* or Principle to our following Arguments; and it is this Hypothesis, *That no Substantial and Indivisible thing ever perisheth*. And this *Epicurus* and all of his Sect must needs grant, as indeed they doe, and much more then it is lawful to plead for; and therefore they make this one of the first Principles of their *Atheistical* Philosophy, *Ex nihilo fieri nil, & in nihilum nil posse reverti*. : But we shall here be content with that sober *Thesis* of *Plato* in his *Timæus*, who attributes the *Perpetuation* of all Substances to the Benignity and Liberality of the Creatour, whom he therefore brings in thus, speaking to the *Angels*, those νέοι θεοὶ, as he calls them, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἐστὲ ἀναθάνατοι οὐδὲ ἄλντοι&c. *You are not of your selves immortal, nor indissoluble; but would relapse and slide back from that Being which I have given you, should I withdraw the influence of my own power from you: but yet you shall hold your Immortality by a Patent of meer grace from my self*. But to return, *Plato* held that the whole world,

6–7 *Ex nihilo fieri nil, & in nihilum nil posse reverti*.] “nothing to be made from nothing, and nothing to be able to revert to nothing”

10 νέοι θεοὶ] “young gods”; *Timæus*, 42d.

11 ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἐστὲ ἀναθάνατοι οὐδὲ ἄλντοι&c.] The passage is from *Timæus*, 41a-b: “Gods of gods, those works whereof I am framer and father are indissoluble save by my will. For though all that is bound may be dissolved, yet to will to dissolve that which is fairly joined together and in good case were the deed of a wicked one. Wherefore ye also, seeing that ye were generated, are not wholly immortal or indissoluble, yet in no wise shall ye be dissolved nor incur the doom of death, seeing that in my will ye possess a bond greater and more sovereign than the bonds wherewith, at your birth, ye were bound together”.

6–7 *Ex nihilo fieri nil, & in nihilum nil posse reverti*.] HGW was doubtless correct in suggesting that a line from *Persius* III, 83 lies behind the tag (and silently emends the text accordingly): “gigni /De nihilo nihilum, in nihilum nil posse reverti” (“nothing can be produced from nothing, nothing can be returned into nothing”), but Smith was also aware that *Epicurus*’ own formulation (reported in *Diogenes Laertius*’ *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 10.35ff), lay behind the innumerable versions which came after him. *Cudworth* gave his own translation: “We fetch the beginning of our Philosophy ... from hence, that Nothing is made out of Nothing or destroy’d to Nothing.” (*Cudworth, The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.30). For a scholastic discussion of which Smith was aware, see *Ballus, De foecunditate Dei*, II, 1-2, pp.113ff..

11 ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἐστὲ ἀναθάνατοι οὐδὲ ἄλντοι&c.] The speech is obviously of crucial importance to the Christian Platonist, with its doctrine of a benevolent and sustaining creator, but a “Patent of meer grace” allows specifically Christian language dominance over a Platonic conception. *Plotinus*’ important comments on the passage are in *Enneads*, I.8.7.

howsoever it might meet with many Periodicall mutations, should remain Eternally ; which I think our Christian Divinity doth no where deny: and so *Plotinus* frames this general Axiom, οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπολείται, *that no Substance shall ever perish*. And indeed if we collate all our own Observations & Experience with such as the History of former times hath delivered to us, we shall not find that ever any substance was quite lost; but though this *Proteus-like Matter* may perpetually change its shape, yet it will constantly appear under one *Form* or another, what art soever we use to destroy it: as it seems to have been set forth in that old *Gryphe* or Riddle of the *Peripatetick* School, *Ælia Lælia Crispis, nec mas, nec fœmina, nec androgyna, nec casta, nec meretrix, nec pudica; sed omnia, &c.* as *Fortunius Licetus* hath expounded it. Therefore it was never doubted whether any piece of *Substance* was lost, till of latter times some hot-brained *Peripateticks*, who could not bring their fiery and subtile fancies to any cool

3 οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπολείται] “nothing that exists is annihilated”; *Enneads*, IV.4.14., in a very different context.

10–11 *Ælia Lælia Crispis, nec mas, nec fœmina, nec androgyna, nec casta, nec meretrix, nec pudica; sed omnia, &c.*] “neither male, nor female, nor androgynous, nor chaste, nor whore, nor modest; but all, etc.”; a version of the inscription on the “Bologna” stone, in the Museo Civico Medievale di Bologna.

1 many Periodicall mutations] Sir Thomas Browne explains Plato’s great cycle (put forward in *Timæus*, 39c) as a “revolution of certaine thousand years when all things should returne to their former estate and he be teaching again in his schoole as when he delivered this opinion” (Browne, *Religio Medici*, I.6). As an eternally recurring history, Plato’s conception is incompatible with the Christian view of history in which the Passion is a unique event.

1–2 should remain Eternally] Reflecting perhaps Cicero’s assertion in *Academica*, II.37.118.

7 *Proteus-like Matter*] cf. Sir Thomas Browne, *The Garden of Cyrus* 5, where Proteus is “in Homer the Symbole of the first matter”.

9 *Gryphe*] “Griph” or “gryphe” was an already an archaic word for a riddle, as Edward Phillips notes in *The New World of English Words* (London, 1658).

10 *Peripatetick*] i.e. Aristotelian

11–12 *Fortunius Licetus* hath expounded it] In his *Allegoria peripatetica de generatione, amicitia, et privatione in Aristotelicum aenigma Elia Leli Crispis* (Padua, 1630). Fortunio Liceti (1577-1657) was an Italian physician, philosopher and scientist. After “refuting” all existing interpretations, Liceti claims the inscription as a fragment of a lost work by Aristotle. There have been many other, equally fanciful speculations on the inscription and the nature of the stone on which it is carved.

13–1 hot-brained *Peripateticks*, who could not bring their fiery and subtile fancies to any cool judgement] For Smith, of course, the metaphors reflect a physiological reality.

13–1 *Peripateticks*] identify

judgement, began rashly to determine that all *Material Forms* (as they are pleased to call them) were lost. For having once jumbled and crouded in a new kind of Being, never anciently heard of, between the parts of a Contradiction, that is *Matter* and *Spirit*, which they call *Material Forms*,
 5 because they could not well tell whence these new upstarts should arise, nor how to dispose of them when *Matter* began to shift herself into some new garb, they condemn'd them to utter destruction; and yet lest they should seem too rudely to controul all Sense and Reason, they found out this common tale which signifies nothing, that these *Substantial Forms*
 10 were educed *ex potentia Materiae*, whenever *Matter* began to appear in any new disguise, and afterwards again returned *in gremium Materiae*; & so they thought them not quite lost. But this Curiosity consisting onely of words fortuitously packt up together, being too subtile for any sober judgment to lay hold upon, and which they themselves could never yet tell how
 15 to define; we shall as carelessly lay it aside, as they boldly obtrude it upon us, and take the common distinction of all *Substantiall Being* for granted,

10 *ex potentia Materiae*] "from the potency of matter"

11 *in gremium Materiae*] "in the bosom of matter"

9 common tale which signifies nothing] Emended in 1821 and 1859 to recall *Macbeth*, V.5.26-8.

10 educed *ex potentia Materiae*] The phrasing reflects the common scholastic formulation. For a contemporary example, see Baronius, *Philosophia theologiae ancillans*, p.68, "de formarum educatione ex potentia materiae" ("about the drawing out of forms from the potentiality of matter"). Boyle's discussion is in Section II of *The Origin of Formes and Qualities* (1666). cf. Pade, *Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum*, pp. 153-154 for sources of the phrase.

11 and afterwards again returned *in gremium Materiae*] The movement envisaged here, the return of substantial forms into the heart of matter, was quite commonly a subject of discussion, from Henry More's somewhat rhapsodic version in *Psychathanasia*, More, *Philosophical Poems: 1647* I.3.27 to Browne's elaborate rhetoric in *Religio Medici* (Browne, *Religio Medici*, I.48). Joseph Glanvil stood gravely with Smith (whose works he had read) on this point. He characterised an old-fashioned "Reverend Disputer" as one who "knows, no doubt, that *First Matter* that is neither *Quid*, nor *Quale*, nor *Quantum*; and that wonderful *Gremium materiae*, out of which *Forms* were educed that were never *there*" (Glanvil, *Plus ultra, or, The progress and advancement of knowledge since the days of Aristotle in an account of some of the most remarkable late improvements of practical, useful learning, to encourage philosophical endeavours: occasioned by a conference with one of the notional way*, p.119).

viz. That it is either *Body*, and so *Divisible*, and of three Dimensions; or else it is something which is not properly a *Body* or *Matter*, & so hath no such Dimensions as that the Parts thereof should be crouding for place, and justling one with another, not being all able to couch together or run
 5 one into another: and this is nothing else but what is commonly called *Spirit*. Though yet we will not be too Critical in depriving everything which is not grossly corporeal of all kind of *Extension*.

We shall therefore now endeavour to prove That the *Soul* of man is something *really distinct* from his *Body*, of an *Indivisible* nature, and so
 10 cannot be divided into such Parts as should flit one from another; and consequently is apt of it's own Nature to remain to Eternity, and so will doe, except the Decrees of Heaven should abandon it from Being.

And first, we shall prove it *ab absurdo*, and here doe as the Mathematicians use to doe in such kind of Demonstrations: we will suppose
 15 that if the Reasonable Soul be not of such an *Immaterial* Nature, then it must be a *Body*, and so suppose it to be made up as all Bodies are: where because the Opinions of Philosophers differ, we shall only take one, viz. that of *Epicurus*, which supposeth it to be made up by a *fortu-*

8–9 That the *Soul* of man is something *really distinct* from his *Body*] cf. Descartes, *Mediationes de prima philosophia, In quibus Dei existentia, & animae humanae a corpore distinctio, demonstrantur* (Amsterdam, 1642): “Meditations on First Philosophy, in which the existence of God and the separateness of the human soul from the body are demonstrated.”

12 except the Decrees of Heaven should abandon it from Being] cf. *Timaeus*, 41b

13 *ab absurdo*] “from absurdity”

1–5 That it is either Body ... one into another] cf. Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia* (Amsterdam, 1654), p.10: “per corpus intelligo illud omne quod aptum est figura aliqua terminari, loco circumscribi, spatium sic replere, ut ex eo aliud omne corpus excludat”. (By “body” I understand all that which is apt to be defined by some shape, to be circumscribed by place, and so to fill space that all other body is excluded from it.)

6–7 will not be too Critical in depriving everything which is not grossly corporeal of all kind of *Extension*] Perhaps suggesting an awareness of the debate between More and Descartes in 1648 about the extension of spirit. For Cudworth’s similar refusal to commit himself, in the preface to *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, see D.B. Sailor, “Cudworth and Descartes”, *JHI*, 23 (1963), p.134. For More’s argument, see Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.833 and Lichtenstein, *Henry More: the rational theology of a Cambridge Platonist*, pp.161ff.

itous Concourse of Atomes; and in that demonstrate against all the rest: (for indeed herein a *particular* Demonstration is an *Universal*, as it is in all Mathematical Demonstrations of this kind.) For if all that which is the *Basis* of our Reasons and Understandings, which we here call *the Substance of the Soul*, be nothing else but a *meer Body*, and therefore be infinitely divisible, as all Bodies are; it will be all one in effect whatsoever notion we have of the generation or production thereof. We may give it, if we please, finer words, and use more demure & smooth language about it then *Epicurus* did, as some that, lest they should speak too rudely and rustically of it by calling it *Matter*, will name it *Efflorescentia Materiæ*; and yet lest that should not be enough, adde *Aristotle's* Quintessence to it too: they will be so trim and courtly in defining of it, that they will not call it by the name of *Aer*, *Ignis*, or *Flamma*, as some of the ancient vulgar Philosophers did, but *Flos flammæ*: and yet the *Epicurean* Poet could use as much Chymistry in exalting his fancy as these subtile Doctors doe; and when he would dress out the Notion of it more gaudily, he resembles it to *Flos Bacchi*, and *Spiritus unguenti suavis*. But when we have taken away this disguise of wanton Wit, we shall find nothing better then *meer Body*, which will be recoiling back perpetually into it's own inert and sluggish

10 *Efflorescentia Materiæ*] “flowering or efflorescence of matter”

11 *Aristotle's* Quintessence] Aristotle posits “something beyond the bodies that are about us on this earth, different and separate from them” in (*de caelo*, 1.2. (269b); for Cicero's account of it, see *academica*, 1.7.

13 *Aer*, *Ignis*, or *Flamma*] “air”, “fire” or “flame”

14 *Flos flammæ*] “the flower of flame”

17 *Flos Bacchi*, and *Spiritus unguenti suavis*] Lucretius, *de rerum natura*, III, 221-2:

“quod genus est Bacchi cum flos evanuit cum

spiritus unguenti suavis diffugit in auras”

(“even so it is, when the flavour of wine has passed away or when the sweet breath of a perfume is scattered to the air.”)

13–14 some of the ancient vulgar Philosophers did] Smith is perhaps thinking of Pre-socratic thinkers like Anaximenes (air) and Heraclitus (fire).

14 *Epicurean* Poet] Lucretius

16–17 when he would dress out the Notion of it more gaudily, he resembles it to *Flos Bacchi*, and *Spiritus unguenti suavis*] Smith's objection is not to Lucretius' use of metaphoric language, but to the movement of thought it embodies. To one from the universe emanates from God, for whom mind and soul are prior to matter, any comparison between the soul and an exhalation will be objectionable. From Smith's point of view. Lucretius begins at the wrong end.

Passiveness: though we may think we have quicken'd it never so much by this subtile artifice of Words and Phrases, a man's new-born *Soul* will for all this be but little better then his *Body*; and, as that is, be but a *rasura corporis alieni*, made up of some small and thin shavings pared off from
 5 the Bodies of the Parents by a continuall motion of the several parts of it; and must afterwards receive its augmentation from that food and nourishment which is taken in, as the Body doth. So that the very Grass we walk over in the fields, the Dust and Mire in the streets that we tread upon, may, according to the true meaning of this dull Philosophy, after many re-
 10 finings, macerations and maturations, which Nature performs by the help of Motion, spring up into so many Rational Souls, and prove as wise as any *Epicurean*, and discourse as subtilely of what it once was, when it lay drooping in a senseless Passiveness. This conceit is so gross, that one would think it wanted nothing but that witty Sarcasm that *Plutarch* cast
 15 upon *Nicocles* the Epicurean, to confute it, ἡ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν αὐτῇ τοσαύτας, οἷαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησας.

But because the heavy minds of men are so frequently sinking into this earthly fancy, we shall further search into the entrails of this Philosophy; and see how like that is to a Rational Soul, which it pretends to declare
 20 the production of. *Lucretius* first of all taking notice of the mighty swiftness and celerity of the *Soul* in all its operations, lest his *Matter* should be too soon tired and not able to keep pace with it, he first casts the *Atomes* prepared for this purpose into such perfect *Sphaerical* & small figures as might be most capable of these swift impressions; for so he, *lib.3.*

*At, quod mobile tantopere est, constare rotundis
 Perquam seminibus debet, perquamque minutis,*

3–4 *rasura corporis alieni*,] “shavings from another body”; the source has not been identified.

15–16 ἡ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν αὐτῇ τοσαύτας, οἷαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησας] “his [Neocles’] mother had just so many atoms within her as, when they came together, must have produced a complete wise man”; *non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*, 18, 1100a-b

24–1

*At, quod mobile tantopere est, constare rotundis
 Perquam seminibus debet, perquamque minutis,*

Momine uti parvo possint impulsa moveri.] “But, because it is so very nimble, it is bound to formed of exceeding round, exceeding tiny seeds, so that its particles may be able to move when smitten by a little impulse”; *Lucretius, de rerum natura*, III, 186-8.

Momine uti parvo possint impulsa moveri.

But here before we go any further, we might inquire what it should be that should move these *small* and *insensible Globes of Matter*. For *Epicurus* his two Principles, which he calls *Plenum* and *Inane*, will here by no means serve our turn to find out *Motion* by. For though our *communes notitiæ* assure us that wherever there is a Multiplicity of parts, (as there is in every Quantitative Being) there may be a Variety of application in those parts one to another, and so a *Mobility*; yet *Motion* it self will not so easily arise out of a *Plenum*, though we allow it an empty *Space* and room enough to play up and down in. For we may conceive a *Body*, which is his *Plenum*, onely as a *trinè dimensum*, being *longum*, *latum* & *profundum*, without attributing any motion at all to it: and *Aristotle* in his *De Cælo* doubts not herein to speak plainly, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος κινήσις οὐκ ἐγγίνεται, *that Motion cannot arise from a Body*. For indeed this Power of *motion* must needs argue some Efficient cause, as *Tully* hath well observed, if we suppose any *rest* antecedent; or if any *Body* be once moving, it must also find some potent Efficient to stay it & settle it in *Rest* as *Simplicius* hath somewhere in his Comment upon *Epictetus* wisely determin'd. So that if we will suppose either *Motion* or *Rest* to be contain'd originally in the nature of any *Body*; we must of necessity conclude some potent Efficient to produce the contrary, or else attribute this Power to

11 *trinè dimensum*] “thing with three dimensions”

11–12 *longum, latum & profundum*] “length, breadth and depth”

13–14 ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος κινήσις οὐκ ἐγγίνεται,] “movement cannot arise out of a body itself”; not, apparently, in *de caelo*.

10–12 For we may conceive ... at all to it] This kind of reasoning, associated with Henry More rather than Smith, owes something to Descartes, particularly in his *Principia philosophiae* (1644). He, too, considered that “mere extension in length, breadth and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance” without any implication of motion, which is “a mode of this extended thing” (*Principia*, I. 53, p.20.), saying that we “can conceive extension without figure or action.”

15–16 *Tully* hath well observed] Smith perhaps recalls Cicero *de finibus bonorum et malorum*, I.6.19, where he points out, in his prolonged discussion of Epicurean physics, that to assert the atoms’ declination without it having any cause is a shameful error in a natural philosopher.

18–19 *Simplicius* hath somewhere in his Comment upon *Epictetus* wisely determin'd.] *Simplicius*’ discussion of motion and rest is in Chapter 38 of his commentary; cf. Descartes, *Principia philosophiae* II.37. For Cudworth’s recognition of the principle, see Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.843.

Bodies themselves; which will at last grow unbounded and infinite, and indeed altogether inconsistent with the nature of a *Body*.

But yet though we should grant all this which *Lucretius* contends for, how shall we force up these *particles of Matter* into any true and real *Perceptions*, and make them perceive their own or others motions, which he calls *Motus sensiferi*? For he having first laid down his Principles of all Being, as he supposeth, (neither is he willing to leave his Deities themselves out of the number) he onely requires these *Postulata* to unfold the nature of all by *Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ*. But how any such thing as *sensation*, or much lesse *Reason*, should spring out of this barren soil, how well till'd soever, no composed mind can imagine. For indeed that infinite variety which is in the *Magnitude* of parts, their *Positions, Figures* and *Motions*, may easily, and indeed must needs, produce an infinite variety of *Phænomena*, which the *Epicureans* philosophy calls *Eventa*. And accordingly where there is a *Sentient faculty*, it may receive the greatest variety of Impressions from them, by which the Perceptions, which are the immediate result of a Knowing faculty, will be distinguish'd: Yet cannot the Power it self of *Sensation* arise from them, no more then *Vision* can arise out of a Glasse, whereby it should be able to perceive these *Idola* that paint themselves upon it, though it were never so exactly polish'd, and they much finer then they are or can be.

Neither can those small *corpuscula*, which in themselves have no power of *sense*, ever produce it by any kind of Concourse or Motion; for so

6 *Motus sensiferi*] "motion that brings sensation"; *de rerum natura*, III.273.

9 *Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ*] "concurrence, motion, order, position, shape"; *de rerum natura*, I.585.

20 *Idola*] "images";

22 *corpuscula*] "particles"

14 *Phænomena*] "phenomena" in the sense of "what is apparent to us through perception", as Proclus puts it. Baltzly, *Commentary on the Timæus, Volume 3*, p.51).

15 *Eventa*] As, for example, at *de rerum natura*, I, 450ff, where he distinguishes "coniuncta", those features of something which are inherent in its nature, and "eventa", which are, as it were, attributes that just happen to be (hence, "accidentals").

20 *Idola*] the word is perhaps suggested by a recollection of Cicero, *de finibus bonorum et malorum*, I.6.21, where he speaks of "images, which they (Epicurus and Democritus) term *eidola*, by the incursion of which we not only see, but think."

a Cause might in its production rise up above the height of its own nature and virtue; which I think every calm contemplator of Truth will judge impossible: for seeing whatsoever any Effect hath, it must needs derive from its Causes, and can receive no other tincture and impression then
 5 they can bestow upon it; that Signature must first be in the Cause it self, which is by it derived to the Effect. And therefore the wisest Philosophers amongst the Ancients universally concluded that there was some higher Principle then meer *Matter*, which was the Cause of all Life and Sense, and that to be Immortal: as the *Platonists*, who thought this reason suffi-
 10 cient to move them to assert a Mundane Soul. And *Aristotle*, though he talks much of *Nature*, yet he delivers his mind so cloudily, that all that he hath said of it may passe with that which he himself said of his)*Acroatici*

12-1 *Acroatici Libri*] “esoteric books”

4 tincture] Perhaps with scientific associations: “In Chymistry, it is a dissolution of the more fine and more volatile Parts of a mixt Body in Spirit of Wine, or some such proper *Menstruum*” Blount, *Glossographia*.

5-6 that Signature must first be in the Cause it self, which is by it derived to the Effect] A fundamental axiom of Neoplatonist thought, with important theological and aesthetic implications. Simplicius made the point sufficiently clearly: “he that produces any thing out of himself, does it by being the Cause of its existing, by having the Cause within himself; and by having some likeness to it in his own Nature; and so, if you respect him as the Cause, the Producing, the Produced, are in some degree the same” in his *Commentary on Epictetus*, 34 Stanhope, *Epictetus his Morals with Simplicius his Comment*, p.216 ; cf. Cudworth’s language when discussing the dependence of hypostases in Platonism in Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.581. Descartes’ formulation is in *Principia philosophiae* Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophiae, in quibus Dei existentia, et animae humanae a corpore distinctio, demonstrantur*. III.

9-10 the *Platonists*, who thought this reason sufficient to move them to assert a Mundane Soul] The immensely influential Platonic doctrine comes from *Timaeus*, 36e. Plotinus’ articulation is relevant here: “Perception of every kind seems to depend on the fact that our universe is a living whole sympathetic to itself: that it is so, appears from the universal participation in power from member to member, and especially in remote parts” (*Enneads*, IV.5.3; cf. IV.4.32). By the 17th century the appeal to the *anima mundi* was a “desperate” explanation of the phenomenon (Glanvill, *The Vanity of Dogmatizing, or, Confidence in opinions manifested in a discourse of the shortness and uncertainty of our knowledge, and its causes: with some reflexions on peripateticism, and an apology for philosophy*, pp.207-8.

12-1 *Acroatici Libri*] Aulus Gellius explains that Aristotle had “two kinds of lectures”: “Those were exoteric which involved the study of rhetoric, logical subtleties, and a knowledge of politics; those were called acroatic which had concern with a more profound and recondite philosophy, and which related to the contemplation of natural objects and dialectic discussion.” (*Noctes Atticae*, XX.5.1.

Libri, or Physicks, that they were ἐκδεδομένοι καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένοι. Nor is it likely that he who was so little satisfied with his own notion of *Nature* as being *the Cause of all Motion and Rest*, as seemingly to desert it while he placeth so many Intelligences about the Heavens, could much please
 5 himself with such a gross conceit of *meer Matter*, that that should be the true Moving and Sentient *Entelech* of some other Matter; as it is manifest he did not.

But indeed *Lucretius* himself, though he could in a jolly fit of his over-
 flush'd and fiery fancy tell us,

10 *Et ridere potest non ex ridentibu' factus,*
Et sapere, & doctis rationem reddere dictis,
Non ex seminibus sapientibus, atque disertis:

yet in more cool thoughts he found his common notions too sturdy to be so easily silenc'd; and therefore sets his wits a-work to find the most *Quint-*
 15 *essential* particles of *Matter* that may be, that might doe that feat, which those smooth *Spherical* bodies, *Calor*, *Aer* and *Ventus* (for all come into this composition) could not doe: and this was of such a subtile and exalted nature, that his earthly fancy could not comprehend it, and therefore he confesses plainly he could not tell what name to give it, though for
 20 want of a better he called it *Mobilem vim*, as neither his Master before him, whose was pleased to compound the Soul (as *Plutarch* relates) of four ingredients, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τίνος ἀκατονομάστου ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ αἰσθητικόν. But because

13 ἐκδεδομένοι καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένοι] “made public, but not made public”; the phrase comes from Aristotle’s letter to Alexander the Great as related in *Noctes Atticae*, XX.5.12
 21–24

Et ridere potest non ex ridentibu' factus,
Et sapere, & doctis rationem reddere dictis,
Non ex seminibus sapientibus, atque disertis:] “a man can laugh, though he has not the increment of laughing atoms, and can think and give reasons with learned lore, though he be not made of seeds thoughtful and eloquent”; *de rerum natura*, II.986-8.

28 *Calor, Aer* and *Ventus*] “warmth, air and wind or spirit”

32 *Mobilem vim*] “moving force”

34–35 ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τίνος ἀκα-

14–15 *Nature* as being *the Cause of all Motion and Rest*] Aristotle says that “nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest” in *Physics*, II.1. 922b

15–16 while he placeth so many Intelligences about the Heavens] recalling, perhaps, *Metaphysics*, XII.1073a

this Giant-like *Proteus* found himself here bound with such strong cords, that notwithstanding all his struggling he could by no means break them off from him, we shall relate his own words the more largely. I find them *lib.3.*

- 5 *Sic calor, atque aer, & venti cæca potestas*
 Mista creant unam naturam, & mobilis illa
 Vis, initium motus ab se quæ dividit ollis:
 Sensifer unde oritur primùm per viscera motus.
 Nam penitus prorsum latet hæc natura, subéstque;
 10 *Nec magis hac infra quidquam est in corpore nostro;*
 Atque anima'st animæ proporrò totius ipsa.
 Quod genus in nostris embris & corpore toto
 Mista latens animi vis est, animæque potestas,
 Corporibus quia de parvis paucisque creata est.
 15 *Sic tibi nominis hæc expers vis, facta minutis*
 Corporibus, latet -

Thus we see how he found himself overmaster'd with difficulties, while he endeavoured to find the place of the *Sensitive powers* in *Matter*: & yet this is the highest that he dares aim at, namely to prove that the *Sensations* might thence derive its Original, as stiffly opposing any Higher power of *Reason*; which we shall *in lucro ponere* against another time.

τονομάστου ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ αἰσθητικόν] “is made of a fiery quality, of a quality like air, of a quality like wind, and of a fourth which has no name, which is itself sensitive”; *de placitis philosophorum*, IV.3.898d.

4–16 *Sic calor, atque aer ...Corporibus, latet -*] “Thus the heat and the air and the unseen power of the spirit (“ventus”) mixed together produce a single nature, together with that nimble force which transmits to them from itself the origin of motion; by which means sense-giving motion first take its rise through he fleshly frame. For this nature lurks secreted in its inmost depths, and nothing in our body is farther beneath our ken than it, and more than this it is the every soul of the whole soul. Just in the same way as the power of the mind and the function of the soul are latent in our limbs and throughout our body, because they are each formed of small and few bodies, even so, you are to know, this nameless power made of minute bodies is concealed ...”; *de rerum nature*, III, 269-280.

21 *in lucro ponere*] “count as a gain”; Estienne Dolet glossed the phrase in Cicero *Pro*

1–3 this Giant-like *Proteus* found himself here bound with such strong cords, that notwithstanding all his struggling he could by no means break them off from him] One version of the story of how *Proteus* can be compelled, by binding him, to show himself in his own shape, and to tell the truth, is told in the *Odyssey*, IV.400ff. cf. above, p. 165.

But surely had not the *Epicureans* abandoned all *Logick* together with some other Sciences (as *Tully* and *Laertius* tell us they did) they would here have found themselves too much prest with this Argument, (which yet some will think to be but *levis armaturæ* in respect of some other) and have found it as little short of a Demonstration to prove the *Soules Immortality* as the *Platonists* themselves did: But herein how they dealt, *Plotinus* hath well observed of them all who denied Lives and Souls to be immortal, which he asserts, and make them nothing but Bodies, that when they were pinch'd with the strength of any Argument fetchd frō the φύσις δραστήριος of the Soul, it was usuall amongst them to call this Body πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχον, or *Ventus certo quodam modo se habens*; to which he well replies, τί τὸ πολυθρύλλητον αὐτοῖς πως ἔχον, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγουσιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ τὰ σώματα φύσιν δραστήριον. Where by this φύσιν δραστήριον seems to be nothing meant but that same thing which *Lucretius* called *vim mobilem*, and he would not allow it to be any thing else but a *Body*, though what kind of *Body* he could not tell: yet by it he understands not meerly an Active power of motion, but a more subtile *Energie*, whereby the force and nature of any motion is perceived and insinuated by its own strength in the bodies moved; as if these sorry Bod-

Flacco, 40: *quod velut praeter spem eveniebat* - something more than was hoped for. *Doletus*, *Commentariorum linguae latinae tomus primus*, col. 1603.

4 *levis armaturæ*] “lightly armoured”; cf. *Caesar*, *de bello Gallico*, 2.10.1.

7 *Plotinus* hath well observed] in *Enneads*, IV.7.4.

10 φύσις δραστήριος] “active nature”; *Enneads*, IV.7.4.

11 πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχον] “spirit in a certain state”; *Enneads*, IV.7.4.

11 *Ventus certo quodam modo se habens*] “spirit which exists in a certain way”; *Ficino's* Latin version of *Enneads*, IV.7.4 reads “spiritus”, not “ventus” *Ficino*, *Theologica platonica de immortalitate animae*, p.275 - hence *HGW's* silent emendation.

12–13 τί τὸ πολυθρύλλητον αὐτοῖς πως ἔχον, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγουσιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ τὰ σώματα φύσιν δραστήριον] “what is this ‘character’ which they are always talking about, in which they take refuge when they are compelled to posit another working principle besides bodies?”; *Enneads*, IV.7.4.

15 *vim mobilem*] cf. above, p. 173.

2 as *Tully* and *Laertius* tell us] Recalling, perhaps, *Cicero*, *academica*, 2.30.97, *de finibus*, I.7.22 and I.19.63, and *Diogenes Laertius' Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 10.30, 31.

8 which he asserts,] a parenthetical comment, i.e. *Plotinus* asserts the immortality of lives and souls.

ies by their impetuous justling together could awaken one another out of their drowsie Lethargie, and make each other hear their mutuall impetuous knocks: which is as absurd as to think a Musical instrument should hear its own sounds, and take pleasure in those harmonious aires that
 5 are plai'd upon it. For that which we call *Sensation*, is not the Motion or Impression which one Body makes upon another, but a *Recognition* of that Motion; and therefore to attribute that to a Body, is to make a Body privy to its own acts and passions, to act upon itself, and to have a true and proper *self-feeling* virtue; which *Porphyrie* hath elegantly expressed,
 10 ὅταν τὸ ζῶον αἰσθάνηται, ἔοικεν ἢ μὲν ψυχὴ ἄρμονία χωριστῇ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς τὰς χορδὰς κινούσῃ ἢ ἡμοσμένας· τῇ δὲ ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς ἄρμονία ἀχωρίστῳ τὸ σῶμα, *In the sensations of living creatures the Soul moves, as if unbodied Harmony her self should play upon an Instrument, and smartly touch the well-tuned strings: but the Body is like that Harmony which dwells inseparably in the*
 15 *strings themselves which have no perception of it.*

Thus we should now leave this *Topick* of our Demonstration, onely we shall adde this as an Appendix to it, which will further manifest the Souls *Incorporeal* and *Immaterial* nature, that is, That there is a *Higher* Principle of knowledge in man then meer *Sense*, neither is that the sole
 20 Original of all that Science that breaks forth in the minds of men; which yet *Lucretius* maintains, as being afraid lest he should be awaken'd out of this pleasant dreame of his, should any Higher power rouse his sleepy

10–11 ὅταν τὸ ζῶον αἰσθάνηται, ἔοικεν ἢ μὲν ψυχὴ ἄρμονία χωριστῇ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς τὰς χορδὰς κινούσῃ ἢ ἡμοσμένας· τῇ δὲ ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς ἄρμονία ἀχωρίστῳ τὸ σῶμα] Taylor translates: “when the animal perceives sensibly, the soul (i.e. the rational soul) appears to be similar to separate harmony, of itself moving the chords adapted to harmony; but the body is similar to the inseparable harmony in the chords (i.e. to the harmony which cannot exist separate from the chords).” T. Taylor, *Select Works of Porphyry*, pp. 207-8; Porphyry, *sententiae*, I.19.

9 *Porphyrie*] The Neoplatonic philosopher (c.233-309 AD) from Tyre is most famous as the editor of Plotinus. The notion of an indwelling harmony was a favourite Neoplatonic speculation. Cudworth was particularly fascinated; cf. Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, pp. 155, 158 etc; Cudworth, *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, p.182; and his important formulation in Cudworth, *A Sermon Preached to the Honourable Society of Lincolnes-Inne*, pp.35f. For Whichote's very different use of the word, cf. Whichcote, *Several Discourses*, IV, pp.71, 73, 148, 230-1 etc.

22–1 sleepy Soul] cf. the reference above to “Lethargie”.

Soul: and therefore he thus layes down the opinion of his Sect,

Invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam

Notitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli:

Nam majore fide debet reperirier illud,

5 *Sponte sua veris quod possit vincere falsa.*

But yet this goodly Champion doth but lay siege to his own Reason, and endeavour to storm the main fort thereof, which but just before he defended against the *Scepticks* who maintained that opinion, *That nothing could be known*; to which he having replied by that vulgar Argument, *That if nothing can be known, then neither doe we know this That we know nothing*; he pursues them more closely with another, *That neither could they know what it is to know, or what it is to be ignorant,*

Quæram, quom in rebus veri nil viderit ante;

Unde sciat, quid sit scire, & nescire vicissim:

15 *Notitiam veri quæ res falsique crearit*

But yet if our *Senses* were the *onely Judges* of things, this *Reflex* knowledge whereby we know what it is to know, would be as impossible as he makes it for *Sense* to have *Innate Idea's* of its own, antecedent to those stamps which the *Radiations* of external Objects imprint upon it. For this knowledge must be antecedent to all that judgement which we pass upon any *Sensatum*, seeing except we first know what it is to know, we could not judge or determine aright upon the approach of any of these *Idola* to our *Senses*.

23–27 *Invenies primis ab sensibus ... possit vincere falsa.*] “You will find that from the senses first has proceeded the knowledge of the true and that the senses cannot be refuted. For then that something ought to be discovered which is of greater credit then they, able of itself to refute things false by true things”; *de rerum nature*, IV.478-81.

34–37

Quæram, quom in rebus veri nil viderit ante;

Unde sciat, quid sit scire, & nescire vicissim:

Notitiam veri quæ res falsique crearit] “I would still put this question, since he has never yet seen any truth in things, whence he knows what knowing and not knowing severally are, and what it is that has produced the knowledge of the true and the false”; *de rerum natura*, IV. 474-6.

44 *Idola*] cf. Diogenes Laertius' account of the Stoic use of the term *phantasia* in *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, VII.45ff. Besides providing the parallel between sense and imagination which Smith assumes, the Stoics argued for clarity and distinctness as criteria for judging the truth of impressions. The images of the seal used by Diogenes Laertius recur. For Plotinus' criticism of the metaphor see below XXX..

But yet our Author may perhaps yet seem to make a more full confession for us in these two points.

First, That no sense can judge another's objects, nor convince it of any mistake,

5 *Non possunt alios alii convincere sensus,
Nec porrò poterunt ipsi reprehendere sese..*

If therefore there be any such thing within us as controlls our *Senses*, as all know there is; then must that be of an Higher nature then our *Senses* are.

10 But secondly, he grants further, That all our *Sensation* is nothing else but *Perception*, and therefore wheresoever there is any hallucination, that must arise from something else within us besides the power of sense,

- *quoniam pars horum maxima fallit
Propter opinatus animi, quos addimus ipsi,*

15 *Pro visis ut sint, quæ non sunt sensibu' visa.*

In which words he hath very happily lighted upon the proper function of *Sense*, and the true reason of all those *mistakes* which we call the *Deceptions of Sense*, which indeed are not truly so, seeing they arise onely from a *Higher Faculty*, and consist not in *Sensation* it self, but in those
20 deductions and Corollaries that our Judgements draw from it.

We shall therefore grant that which the *Epicurean* philosophy, and the

4-6

*Non possunt alios alii convincere sensus,
Nec porrò poterunt ipsi reprehendere sese.*] “any one sense cannot confute another. No nor can any sense take itself to task”; *de rerum natura*, IV.496-7. Diogenes Laertius argues the point more fully: “one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; not can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same” (*Lives*, 10.32).

12-15

- *quoniam pars horum maxima fallit
Propter opinatus animi, quos addimus ipsi,
Pro visis ut sint, quæ non sunt sensibu' visa.*] “since the greatest part of these cases cheats us on account of the mental suppositions which we add of ourselves, taking those things as seen which have not been seen by the senses”; *de rerum nature*, IV.464-66.

Peripatetick too, though not without much caution, pleads for universally, *That our Senses are never deceived*, whether they be *sani* or *læsi*, sound or distempered, or whatsoever proportion or distance the *Object* or *medium* bears to it: for if we well scan this business, we shall find that nothing
 5 of *Judgement* belongs to *Sense*, it consisting onely ἐν αἰσθητηρίῳ πάθει in Perception; neither can it make any just observation of those *Objects* that are without, but onely discerns its own passions, and is nothing else but γνῶσις τῶν παθῶν, and tells how it finds it self affected, and not what is the true cause of those impressions which it finds within it self; (which seems
 10 to be the reason of that old Philosophical maxim recited by *Aristotle* *l.3. de Anima, cap.2.* οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως, that these *simulacra* were only in our senses; which notion a late Author hath pursued:) and therefore when the Eye finds the Sun's circle represented within it self of no greater a bigness then a foot-diameter, it is not at all

2 *sani* or *læsi*] “healthy” or “injured”

5 ἐν αἰσθητηρίῳ πάθει] “in what happens to the sense organ”; cf. Proclus, *Commentary on the “Timaeus”, 76e.*

8 γνῶσις τῶν παθῶν] “knowledge of what happens”; cf. Proclus, *Commentary on the “Timaeus”, 76c.*

11 οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως] “without sight there was no black, without taste no savour”; adapted from Aristotle, *de anima*, III.2.426a.

12 *simulacra*] “images”

8 γνῶσις τῶν παθῶν] cf. Cudworth, *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, p.79, where sensations are “not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the same manner that a signature is upon a piece of Wax”, but “must needs arise partly from some Inward Vital Energy of the Soul itself, being Phantasms of the Soul, or several modes of Cogitation or Perception in it. For which cause some of the *Platonists* would not allow sensations to be Passions of the Soul, but only *Active Knowledge of the Passions* of the Body (παθῶν γνῶσεις).”

10 that old Philosophical maxim recited by *Aristotle*] The implication is, as elsewhere, that Aristotle is the instrument of a long tradition, rather than an authority in his own right.

12 a late Author] Rather than the succinct account of the senses in Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, 4.189, p. 297-8, Smith may well have in mind the discussion in Gassendi, *De apparente magnitudine solis humilis et sublimis epistolae*, Epistle IIII, IX and X (pp. 186ff). Smith's copy is still in Queens' Library.

13–1 when the Eye finds the Sun's circle represented within it self of no greater a bigness then a foot-diameter, it is not at all herein mistaken] Proclus asks, “what is it in us which judges and says, that the sight is deceived when it asserts that the sun is but a foot in diameter, and that the taste which pronounces honey to be bitter, is the taste of those that are diseased”, (*Commentary on the “Timaeus”, 76e.*)

herein mistaken; nor a distempered Palate, when it tastes a bitterness in the sweetest honey, as *Proclus* a famous *Mathematician* and *Platonist* hath well determined, *in Plat. Tim.* αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις τὸ ἐαυτῶν ἀπαγγέλλουσι πάθημα, καὶ οὐ πάντα ψεύδονται, The Senses in all things of this nature doe
 5 but declare their own passions or perceptions, which are alwaies such as they seem to be, whether there be any such *parallelum signaculum* in the Object as bears a true analogie with them or not: and therefore in truth they are never deceived in the execution of their own functions. And so doth *Aristotle l.3 de Anima, c.3.* conclude, That error is neither
 10 in Sense nor Phansy, οὐδαὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος, it is in no Facultie but onely that in which is Reason. Though it be as true on the other side, that *Epicurus* & all his Sect were deceived, while they judged the Sun and Moon and all the Starrs to be no bigger then that Picture and Image which they found of them in their own Eyes; for which silly conceit
 15 though they had been for many Ages sufficiently laugh'd at by wise men, yet could not *Lucretius* tell how to enlarge his own fancy, but believes the *Idolum* in his own Visive organ to be adequate to the Sun it self, in

3–4 αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις τὸ ἐαυτῶν ἀπαγγέλλουσι πάθημα, καὶ οὐ πάντα ψεύδονται] “for the senses frequently announce various passions, and not such as things of this kind are in themselves”; cf. *Proclus, Commentary on the “Timaeus”, 76e*

6 *parallelum signaculum*] “parallel little sign”

10 οὐδαὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος] “thought belongs to no animal which has not reasoning power”; *Aristotle, de anima, III.3.427b.* HGW argues that the context implies a misunderstanding by Smith, and summarises *Aristotle*: “Perceptions by the sense (says he) are true, and are the property of all animals; but it is possible to make a false use of the imagination which is possessed by none in whom reason does not exist.”

17 *Idolum*] “image”

6–7 whether there be any such *parallelum signaculum* in the Object as bears a true analogie with them or not] *Descartes* thought not; cf. *Principia philosophiae* *Descartes, Principia philosophiae, 4.197, p.302-3.*

12–14 *Epicurus* & all his Sect were deceived, while they judged the Sun and Moon and all the Starrs to be no bigger then that Picture and Image which they found of them in their own Eyes] cf. *Cicero, de finibus, I.20,* reports that “*Democritus*, being an educated man and well versed in geometry, thinks the sun is of vast size; *Epicurus* considers it perhaps a foot in diameter, for he pronounces it to be exactly as large as it appears, or a little larger or smaller.” cf. *Lucretius, de rerum nature, V.564ff.*; for *Descartes’* comment, see the *epistola auctoris* in *Principia philosophiae*; see also *Gassendi, De apparente magnitudine solis humilis et sublimis epistolae, Epistola IIII,* for his discussion.

16–17 yet could not *Lucretius* tell how to enlarge his own fancy, but believes the *Idolum* in his own Visive organ to be adequate to the Sun it self] cf. *Lucretius, de rerum naturae, V.565.*

despight of all Mathematicall demonstration; as indeed he must needs, if there were no *Higher* principle of knowledge then *Sense* is, which is the most indisciplinable thing that may be, and can never be taught that Truth which Reason and Understanding might attempt to force into it. αἴσθησις
 5 κᾶν μυριάκις ἀκούη τοῦ λόγου λέγοντος ὅτι μείζων ὁ ἥλιος τῆς γῆς, &c. *Though Reason inculcates this notion ten thousand times over, That the Sun is bigger then the Earth, yet will not the Eye be taught to see it any bigger then a foot breadth:* and therefore he rightly calls it, as all the Platonical and Stoical philosophie doth, ἄλογόν τι, and it may well be put among the
 10 rest of the Stoicks ἄλογα πάθη .

Thus I hope by this time we have found out κρείττοντά τινα τῆς αἰσθησεως δύναμιν , some *more noble Power* in the Soul then that is by which it accommodates it self to the Body, and according to the measure and proportion thereof converseth with External Matter. And this is the true
 15 reason why we are so apt to be mistaken in Sensible objects, because our Souls sucking in the knowledge of external things thereby, and not minding the proportion that is between the Body and them, mindless of its own notions, collates their corporeal impressions with externall objects themselves, and judgeth of them one by another. But whensoever our Souls
 20 act in their own power and strength, untwisting themselves from all corporeal complications, they then can find confidence enough to judge of things in a seeming contradiction to all those other *visa corporea*.

And so I suppose this Argument will amount to no lesse then a Demonstration of the Soul's *Immateriality*, seeing to all *sincere understanding* it

4–5 αἴσθησις κᾶν μυριάκις ἀκούη τοῦ λόγου λέγοντος ὅτι μείζων ὁ ἥλιος τῆς γῆς, &c.] “But sense though it should hear reason ten thousand times asserting that the sun is greater than the earth, yet would still see it to be a foot in diameter, and would not otherwise announce it to us;” Proclus, *Commentary on the “Timaeus”*,77a.

9 ἄλογόν τι] “something unreasoning”; cf. Proclus, *Commentary on the “Timaeus”*,76f.

10 ἄλογα πάθη] “irrational feelings”; cf. Aristotle, *ethica Nichomacea*, 1111b.

11–12 κρείττοντά τινα τῆς αἰσθήσεως δύναμιν] “a certain power superior to the senses”; Proclus, *Commentary on the “Timaeus”*,76e.

22 *visa corporea*] “bodily images”.

14–19 this is the true reason ... one by another] Descartes explains; “We have all, without exception, from our youth judged that all the things we perceived by our senses had an existence beyond our thought, and that they were entirely similar to the sensation, that is, perceptions we had of them” in Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, 1.66, p. 26.

is necessary that it should thus abstract it self from all corporeal commerce, and return from thence nearer into it self.

Now what we have to this purpose more generally intimated, we shall further branch out in these two or three Particulars.

5 First, That that *Mental faculty* and power whereby we *judge* and *discern* things, is so far from being a *Body*, that it must *retract* and *withdraw* it self from all *Bodily operation* whensoever it will nakedly *discern* Truth. For should our Souls alwaies mould their judgment of things according to those *παθήματα* and impressions which seem to be framed thereof in
 10 the *Body*, they must then doe nothing else but chain up *Errours* and *Delusions* one with another in stead of Truth: as should the judgements of our *Understandings* wholly depend upon the sight of our *Eyes*, we should then conclude that our meer accesses and recesses from any *Visible Object* have such a *Magical power* to change the magnitudes of *Visible Objects*, and to transform them into all varieties of figures & fashions; and
 15 so attribute all that variety to them which we find in our corporal perceptions. Or should we judge of *Gustables* by our *Tast*, we should attribute to one and the self-same thing all that variety which we find in our own *Palates*. Which is an unquestionable *Argument* That that *Power* whereby we
 20 discern of things and make judgments of them different and sometimes contrary to those perceptions that are the necessary results of all *Organical functions*, is something distinct from the *Body*; and therefore though the *Soul*, as *Plato* hath well observed, be *μεριστή περὶ τὰ σώματα*, various and divisible accidentally in these *Sensations* and *Motions* wherein it extends and spreads it self as it were upon the *Body*, and so according to
 25 the nature and measure thereof perceives its impressions; yet it is *ἐν ἑαυ-*

9 *παθήματα*] “things that are learnt”

23 *μεριστή περὶ τὰ σώματα*] “divisible in bodies”; adapted from *Timaeus*, 35a.

26–1 *ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἀμερίστη*] “in itself indivisible”.

17–19 should we judge of *Gustables* by our *Tast*, we should attribute to one and the self-same thing all that variety which we find in our own *Palates*] As Descartes observes in *Principia Philosophiae* Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, 1.71, p.29.

23 *μεριστή περὶ τὰ σώματα*] Smith adopts the language of the language of the *Timaeus*, where the “being which is indivisible and unchangeable” is “compounded” with “that kind which is distributed among bodies”; “the indivisible kind” with “that which is proportioned out in bodies” (35a). cf. Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, pp.824f.

τῆ ἀμερίστη indivisible, returning into itself. Whensoever it will speculate Truth it self, it will not then listen to the several clamours and votes of these rude Senses which alwaies speak with divided tongues; but it consults some clearer Oracle within itself: and therefore *Plotinus, Enn.4.1.3.*
 5 hath well concluded concerning the Body, ἐμπόδιον τοῦτο, εἴ τις αὐτῷ ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι προσχρῶτο, *should a man make use of his Body in his Speculations*, it will entangle his mind with so many contradictions, that it will be impossible to attain to any true knowledge of things. We shall conclude this therefore, as *Tully* doth his Contemplation of the Soules operations
 10 about the frame of Nature, the fabrick of the Heavens and motions of the Stars, *Animus qui hæc intelligit, similis est ejus qui ea fabricatus in cælo est* .

Secondly, We also find *such a Faculty* within our own Souls as *collects* and *unites* all the Perceptions of our several Senses, and is able to *com-*
 15 *pare* them together; something in which they all meet as in one Centre: which *Plotinus* hath well expressed, δεῖ τοῦτο ὡσπερ κέντρον εἶναι· γραμμὰς δὲ συλλαβούσας ἐκ περιφεπέας κύκλου, τὰς πρανταχόθεν αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τοῦτο περαίνειν, καὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἶναι ἐν ὅτῳ, That in which all those *several Sensations* meet as so many *Lines* drawn from several points
 20 in the *Circumference*, and which comprehends them all, must needs be *One*. For should *that* be *various* and consisting of several parts, which thus receives all these various impressions, then must the *sentence* and *judgment* passed upon them be *various* too. *Aristotle* in his *de Anima*, Δεῖ τὸ ἐν λέγειν ὃ, τι ἕτερον, *That must be one that judgeth things to be*

31–32 ἐμπόδιον τοῦτο, εἴ τις αὐτῷ ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι προσχρῶτο] “it is detrimental to any thinking on which it is allowed to intrude”; *Enneads*, IV.3.19.

37–38 *Animus qui hæc intelligit, similis est ejus qui ea fabricatus in cælo est*] “the soul which has understood these things, is like his who made them in heaven”; adapted from *Tusculanae disputationes*, I.26.

42–44 δεῖ τοῦτο ὡσπερ κέντρον εἶναι· γραμμὰς δὲ συλλαβούσας ἐκ περιφεπέας κύκλου, τὰς πρανταχόθεν αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τοῦτο περαίνειν, καὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἶναι ἐν ὅτῳ] “this principle is, as it were, a centre, and the particular sensations like lines which are directed from the circumference towards this centre. This central principal is essentially one.” *Enneads*, IV.7.6.

50 Δεῖ τὸ ἐν λέγειν ὃ, τι ἕτερον] “that which says there is a difference must be one”; *Aristotle, de anima*, III.2. 426b.

28–29 the several clamours and votes of these rude Senses which alwaies speak with divided tongues] As elsewhere, Smith’s language is coloured by his times.

diverse; and that must judge too ἐν ἀρχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ, setting all before it at once. Besides we could not conceive how such an immense variety of impressions could be made upon any piece of Matter, which should not obliterate and deface one another. And therefore *Plotinus* hath well
 5 disputed against them who make all Sensation τυπώσεις καὶ ἐνσφραγίσεις ἐν ψυχῇ· which brings me to the third.

Thirdly, That Knowledge which the Soul retains in it self of *things past*, and in some sort Prevision of *things to come*, whereby many grow so sagacious in fore-seeing future Events, that they know how to deliberate
 10 and dispose of *present* affairs, so as to be ready furnished and prepared for such Emergencies as they see in a train and Series of Causes which sometimes work but contingently: I cannot think *Epicurus* himself could in his cool thoughts be so unreasonable as to perswade himself, that all the shuffling & cutting of *Atomes* could produce such a Divine piece of
 15 Wisdom as this is. What *Matter* can thus bind up *Past*, *Present* and *Future* time together? which while the Soul of man doth, it seems to imitate (as far as its own finite nature will permit it to strive after an imitation of) God's eternity: and grasping and gathering together a long Series of duration into it self, makes an essay to free it self from the rigid laws
 20 of it, and to purchase to it self the freedome of a true Eternity. And as by its χρονικοὶ πρόοδοι (as the Platonists are wont to speak) its *Chronical*

1 ἐν ἀρχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ] “in undivided time”; Aristotle, *de anima*, III.2. 426b.

5–6 τυπώσεις καὶ ἐνσφραγίσεις ἐν ψυχῇ·] “the impressions and prints of seals in the soul”; *Enneads*, IV.6.1.

21 χρονικοὶ πρόοδοι] “temporal processions”; perhaps recalling Plotinus' discussion in *Enneads*, 3,7, 11.

5–6 τυπώσεις καὶ ἐνσφραγίσεις ἐν ψυχῇ·] Notwithstanding such implicit approval of Plotinus' position, which he supports by arguments from the nature of memory, the Cambridge Platonists remained faithful to the traditional metaphors of “stamps”, “seal” and “impressions”.
 14 the shuffling & cutting of *Atomes*] The metaphor of atoms in a universal game of cards reflects, of course, the Epicurean doctrine of creation by a “fortuitous concourse” of atoms.

15–16 *Past*, *Present* and *Future* time] The idea of three times, “a present time of past things; a present time of present things; and a present time of future things”, all of which are contained in the *nunc stans* of eternity, and are divided to man, as memory, sight, and expectation, is thoroughly Augustinian; cf. *Confessions*, XI.14ff. For Cudworth's “imitation of eternity”, see Gysi, *Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth*, p.2.

and successive operations, it unravels and unfolds the contexture of its own indefinite intellectual powers by degrees; so by this *Memory* and *Prevision* it recollects and twists them up all together again into it self. And though it seems to be continually sliding from it self in those several
 5 vicissitudes and changes which it runs through in the constant variety of its own Effluxes and Emanations; yet is it alwaies returning back again to its first Original by a swift remembrance of all those motions and multiplicity of operations which have begot in it the first sense of this constant flux. As if we should see a Sun-beam perpetually flowing forth from the bright
 10 body of the Sun, and yet ever returning back to it again; it never loseth any part of its Being, because it never forgets what it self was: and though it may number out never so vast a length of its duration, yet it never comes nearer to its old age, but carrieth a lively sense of its youth and infancy, which it can at pleasure lay a fast hold on, along with it.

15 But if our *Souls* were nothing else but a *Complex of fluid Atomes*, how should we be continually roving and sliding from our selves, and soon forget what once we were? The *new Matter* that would come in to fill up that *Vacuity* which the *Old* had made by its departure, would never know what the *Old* were, nor what that should be that would succeed
 20 that: ὡσπερ ξένη φυχή αὐτή ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἔσται, ὧν ἡ ἐτέρα οἶδε, καὶ ὡσπερ ὁ ἄλλος ὄργος ἡμῶν, *that new pilgrim and stranger-like Soul would alwaies*

20–21 ὡσπερ ξένη φυχή αὐτή ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἔσται, ὧν ἡ ἐτέρα οἶδε, καὶ ὡσπερ ὁ ἄλλος ὄργος ἡμῶν] Adapted from *Enneads*, IV.7.5.: “a soul which will remain, as it were, foreign to the former one, and which will not have the same knowledge, and be, so to speak another, another physical mass”.

2–8 so by this *Memory* ... this constant flux] cf. Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.645: “the Duration of every thing, must of necessity be agreable to its Nature; and therefore, As that who *Imperfect Nature* is ever *Flowing* like a River, and consists in *Continual Motion* and *Changes* one after another, must needs have accordingly a *Successive* and *Flowing Duration*, sliding perpetually from *Present* into *Past*, and always posting on towards the *Future*, expecting Some thing of it self, which is not yet in being, but to come: So must that, whose *Perfect Nature*, is *Essentially Immutable*, and always the *Same*, and *Necessarily Existent*, have a *Permanent Duration*; never losing any thing of it self once *Present*, as sliding away from it; nor yet running forwards to meet something of it self before, which is not yet in being.”

9–10 As if we should see ... back to it again] A classic expression of the pattern of emanation in a characteristically dynamic image. Some of the Christian and Platonist analogies and implications are discussed in the Introduction, p.XXX

be ignorant of what the other before it knew, and we should be wholly some other bulk of Being then we were before, as Plotinus hath excellently observed Enn.4.1.7.c.5. It was a famous speech of wise Heraclitus, εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν δις οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, a man cannot enter twice into the same
 5 *River: by which he was wont symbolically to express the constant flux of Matter, which is the most unstable thing that may be. And if Epicurus could free this Heap of refined Atomes, which it makes the Soul to be, from this inconstant and flitting nature, and teach us how it could be μόνιμον τι*
 10 *some stable and immutable thing, alwaies resting entire while it is in the Body: though we would thank him for such a good conceit as this is, yet we would make no doubt but it might as well be able to preserve it self from dissolution and dissipation out of this gross Body, as in it: seeing it is no more secured from the constant impulses of that more gross Matter which is restlessly moving up and down in the Body, then it is out of it:*
 15 *and yet for all that we should take the leave to ask Tully's question with his sober disdain, Quid, obsecro, terrâne tibi aut hoc nebuloso & caliginoso cæno aut sata aut concreta videtur tanta vis memoriæ? Such a jewel as this is too precious to be found in a dunghill: meer Matter could never thus stretch forth its feeble force, & spread it self over all its own former*
 20 *præexistencies. We may as well suppose this dull and heavy Earth we tread upon to know how long it hath dwelt in this part of the Universe that now it doth, and what variety of Creatures have in all past Ages sprung*

3-4 εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν δις οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης] "No man ever steps into the same river twice."

8 μόνιμον τι] "something stable".

15 Tully] Cicero

16-17 Quid, obsecro, terrâne tibi aut hoc nebuloso & caliginoso cæno aut sata aut concreta videtur tanta vis memoriæ?] "I beseech you: can you imagine this wonderful power of memory to be sown in or to be a part of the composition of the earth, or of this dark and gloomy atmosphere?" cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, I.25.60:

3-4 εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν δις οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης] Allusions to this famous remark are frequent and various, from Plato's *Cratylus* (401d, 402a), but a comprehensive collection may be found in Marcovich's *editio maior* of Heraclitus (Merida, Venezuela, 1967). Smith's source was Simplicius' *Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle* (Marcovich 40c6, p.202). Plutarch cites a slightly different version in *On the E at Delphi*, 392b.

12 dissipation] *Dissipation*, (Lat.) a consuming, Wasting, Scattering. Blount, *Glossographia*.

17-18 Such a jewel as this is too precious to be found in a dunghill] recalling Aesop's fable of the cockerel and the jewel.

forth from it, and all those occurrences & events which have all this time happened upon it.

We have done with that which we intended for the First part of our Discourse of the Soul's *Immortality*: we have hitherto look'd at it rather *in*
 5 *Concreto* then *in Abstracto*, rather as a Thing complicated with and united to the Body; and therefore considered it in those Operations, which as they are not proper to the Body, so neither are they altogether independent upon it, but are rather of a mixt nature.

We shall now take notice of it in those *Properties*, in the exercise
 10 whereof it hath less commerce with the *Body*, and more plainly declares its own high descent to us, That it is able to subsist and act without the aid and assistance of this *Matter* which it informs.

And here we shall take that course that *Aristotle* did in his Books *de Anima*, and first of all inquire, *Whether it hath ἴδιον τι, some kind of Action*
 15 *so proper and peculiar to it self, as not to depend upon the Body*. And this soon offers it self in the first place to us in those *Elicite motions* of it, as the Moralists are wont to name them, which though they may end in those they call *Imperate acts*, yet have their first Emanation from nothing else but the Soul it self.

For this purpose we shall take notice of Two sorts of *Actions* which are
 20 obvious to the experience of every one that observes himself, according to a double Source & emanation of them, which a late Philosopher hath very

4–5 *in Concreto* then *in Abstracto*] “in a concrete sense than in an abstract sense”

14 ἴδιον τι] “something peculiar to itself”; cf. Aristotle, *de anima*, I.1.402a.

11–12 That it is able to subsist and act without the aid and assistance of this *Matter* which it informs] cf. *Enneads*, IV.8.1.

16 *Elicite motions*] “Elicit” motions are those “evolved immediately from an active power or quantity; opposed to imperate” (OED). The elicit acts of the will are its internal acts, ie the volitions themselves.

18 *Imperate acts*] The “imperate” acts of the will are those commanded by it. For Descartes' similar distinction between “actions of the Soul which terminate in the soul itself”, and “actions which terminate in our Body”, see Descartes, *The Passions of the Soule*, I.18, p.17. cf. Sir Matthew Hale's use of the distinction in *The Primitive Origination of Mankind* (London, 1677), p.29.

22 a late Philosopher] Perhaps Descartes, again.

happily suggested to us. The first are those *Actions* which arise up within us *without any Animadversion*; the other are those that are *consequent to it*.

For we find frequently *such Motions* within our selves which *first are*,
 5 before we take notice of them, and which by their own turbulency and impetuosity force us to an *Advertency*: as those *Fiery spirits* and that *inflamed Blood* which sometimes fly up into the head; or those gross and Earthly *Fumes* that disturb our brains; the stirring of many other *Humours* which beget within us Grief, Melancholy, Anger, or Mirth, or other *Pas-*
 10 *sions*; which have their rise from such *Causes* as we were not aware of, nor gave no consent to create this trouble to us. Besides all those *Passions* and *Perceptions* which are begotten within us by some external motions which derives themselves through our Senses, and fiercely knocking at the door of our Minds and Understandings force them some-
 15 times from their deepest debates & musings of some other thing, to open to them and give them an audience.

Now as to such *Motions* as these are, it being necessary for the preservation of our Bodies that our Souls should be acquainted with them, a mans Body was so contrived and his Soul so united to it, that they
 20 might have a speedy access to the Soul. Indeed some ancient Philosophers thought that the Soul descending more deeply into the Body, as they expresse it, first begot these corporeal motions unbeknown to it self by reason of its more deep immersion, which afterwards by their impetuosity excited its advertency. But whatsoever truth there is in
 25 that Assertion, we clearly find from the relation of our own Souls themselves, that our Soul disowns them, and acknowledgeth no such *Motions* to have been so busy by her commission; neither knows what they are, from whence they arise, or whither they tend, untill she hath duly examined them. But these *Corporeal motions* as they seem to arise from
 30 nothing else but meerly from the *Machina* of the Body it self; so they could

30 *Machina* of the Body] “machinery”

1–3 The first are those *Actions* which arise up within us *without any Animadversion*; the other are those that are *consequent to it*] cf., for example, Descartes’ *Principia Philosophiae*, I,9; IV.190.

6 *Advertency*] *Advertency*. Heed, Carefulness, Attention (Blount, *Glossographia*).

30 *Machina* of the Body] The Cartesian implications of the phrase are inescapable.

not at all be sensated but by the Soul.

Neither indeed are all our own *Corporeal actions* perceived by us, but onely those that may serve to maintain a good correspondence & intelligence between the Soul and Body, and so foment & cherish that Sympathy between them which is necessary for the subsistence and well-being of the whole man in this mundane state. And therefore there is very little of that which is commonly done in our Body, which our Souls are informed at all of. The *constant Circulation of Blood* through all our *Veins and Arteries*; the common *motions* of our *Animal spirits* in our *Nerves*; the *maceration* of *Food* within our *Stomachs*, and the *distribution* of *Chyle* and nourishment *to every part* that wants the relief of it; the constant *flux* and *reflux of more sedate Humours* within us; the *dissipations* of our corporeal *Matter* by *insensible Transpiration*, and the *accesses of new* in the room of it; all this we are little acquainted with by any vital energie which ariseth from the union of Soul and Body: and therefore when we would acquaint our selves with the *Anatomy* and vital functions of our own Bodies, we are fain to use the same course and method that we would to find our the same things in any other kind of Animal, as if our Souls had as little to doe with any of these in our Bodies, as they have in the Bodies of any other Brute creature.

But on the other side, we know as well, that many things that are done by us, are done at the dictate and by the commission of our own Wills; and therefore all such Actions as these are, we know, without any great store of Discursive inquiry, to attribute to their own proper causes, as seeing the efflux and propagation of them. We doe not by a naked speculation know our Bodies first to have need of nourishment, and then by the Edict of our Wills injoyn our Spirits and Humours to put themselves into an hungry and craving posture within us by corroding the Tunicles of

9 *Animal spirits*] “a certain aire, or exceeding subtle wind, which is tearmed the Animall spirits”: Descartes, *The Passions of the Soule*, I.7, p.7.

10 *maceration*] “*Maceration*, (Lat.) a making lean, weakning or bringing down. Also soaking or steeping in some Liquor.”Blount, *Glossographia*.

10 *Chyle*] “*Chyle*, the white Juice of digested Meat, the Matter whereof the Blood is made” Blount, *Glossographia*.

28 Tunicles] Blount explains:“*Tunicle*, in Anatomy, a Membranous Coat covering any part of the Body” Blount, *Glossographia*.

the Stomach; but first we find our own Souls solicited by these motions, which yet we are able to gainsay, and to deny those petitions which they offer up to us. We know we commonly meditate and discourse of such Arguments as we our selves please: we mould designs, and draw up a
 5 plot of means answerable thereto, according as the free vote of our Soul determines; and use our own Bodies many times, notwithstanding all the reluctancies of their nature, onely as our Instruments to serve the will and pleasure of our Souls. All which as they evidently manifest a true *Dis-*
 10 *tinction* between *the Soul* and *the Body*, so they doe as evidently prove the *Supremacy* and dominion which the Soul hath over the Body. Our Moralists frequently dispute what kind of government that is whereby the *Soul*, or rather *Will*, rules over the *Sensitive* Appetite, which they ordinarily resolve to be *Imperium politicum*; though I should rather say, that all good men have rather a true *despotal power* over their *Sensitive fac-*
 15 *ulties*, and over the whole Body, though they use it onely according to the laws of Reason and Discretion. And therefore the *Platonists* and *Stoicks* thought the Soul of man to be absolutely freed from all the power of *Astral Necessity*, and uncontrollable impressions arising from the subordination and mutual Sympathie and Dependance of all mundane causes, which is
 20 their proper notion of *Fate*. Neither ever durst that bold *Astrologie* which presumes to tell the Fortunes of all corporeal Essences, attempt to enter into the secrets of man's Soul, or predict the destinies thereof. And indeed whatever the destinies thereof may be that are contained in the vast volume of an Infinite and Almighty Mind, yet we evidently find a τὸ ἐφ' ἡ-

13 *Imperium politicum*] "political control."

24-1 τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν] "something in our power"; cf.

14 *despotal power*] cf. Proclus, in *Timaeo*, 175F.

20 that bold *Astrologie*] cf. Cudworth's discussion in Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.4ff. He eventually asserts that Origen's view, that "the Stars do not Make but Signifie", is "the best Sence that can be made out of Astrological Prognostication: but it is a business that stands upon a very weak and tottering, if not Impossible Foundation" (p.5). cf. Plotinus, II.3.

24-1 τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν] cf. "We seem clearly to be led by the *instincts of nature* to think that there is something ἐφ' ἡμῶν, *In nostra potestate, In our own power* (though dependently upon God Almighty), and that we are not altogether passive in our acting, nor determined by inevitable necessity in whatsoever we do." Cudworth, *A treatise of Freewill*, p.1. For a recent discussion of Cudworth's use of Stoicism, see John Sellars, "Stoics against Stoics in Cudworth's 'A Treatise of Freewill'", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 20 (5), pp. 935-52

ἡμῶν, an ἀντεξούσιον, a liberty of Will within our selves, maugre the stubborn
 malice of all Second Causes. And *Aristotle*, who seems to have disputed
 so much against that ἀυτοκινήσια of Souls which his Master before him
 had soberly maintained, does indeed but quarrel with that common sense
 5 and Experience which we have of our Souls; this ἀυτοκινήσια of the Soul
 being nothing else but that Innate force and power which it hath within it,
 to stir up such thoughts and motions within it self as it finds itself most free
 to. And therefore when we reflect upon the productions of our own Souls,
 we are soon able to find out the first Efficient cause of them. And though
 10 the subtilty of some Wits may have made it difficult to find out whether
 the *Understanding* or the *Will* or some other Facultie of the Soul be the
First Mover, whence the *motus primò primus* (as they please to call it)
 proceeds; yet we know it is originally the Soul it self whose vital acts they
 all are and although it be not ἀυτόθεν πρώτη the First Cause as deriving all
 15 its virtue from it self, as *Simplicius* distinguisheth in *l. de An.cap. I.* yet it is
 ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις φυσικῇ, vitally co-working with the First Causes of all. But
 on the other side, when we come to examine those Motions which arise
 from the Body, this stream runs so far under ground, that we know not how
 to trace it to the head of it; but we are fain to *analyse* the whole artifice,
 20 looking from the *Spirits* to the *Blood*, from that to the *Heart*, viewing all

25 ἀντεξούσιον] “something in one’s own power”

27 ἀυτοκινήσια] “power of moving themselves”

36 *motus primò primus*] “first movement of the first”

38 ἀυτόθεν πρώτη] “spontaneously first”

40 ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις φυσικῇ] “produced among the first”; *Commentary on Aristotle’s de anima*, 7, 26, commenting on *de anima* l.1, 402a.

25–26 a liberty of Will within our selves, maugre the stubborn malice of all Second Causes] cf. Cudworth, *A treatise of Freewill*, pp.31ff.

26–28 *Aristotle*, who seems to have disputed so much against that ἀυτοκινήσια of Souls which his Master before him had soberly maintained,] Smith may be thinking of *Aristotle’s* discussion in *de anima*, l,3, 406a-b.

27–28 Master before him had soberly maintained] Plato, of course. cf. *Timaeus*, 88e; *Phaedrus*, 245e; *Laws* X, 895c; etc.

34–36 whether the *Understanding* or the *Will* or some other Facultie of the Soul be the *First Mover*] cf. the discussion in Cudworth, *A treatise of Freewill*, pp.20-1.

37–38 yet we know it is originally the Soul it self whose vital acts they all are] cf. Cudworth, *A treatise of Freewill*, pp.26ff.

39 as *Simplicius* distinguisheth] in his *Commentary on Aristotle’s de anima*, 7, 26, commenting on *de anima* 402a.

along the *Mechanical* contrivance of *Veins* and *Arteries*: neither know we after all our search whether there be any *Perpetuum mobile* in our own Bodies, or whether all the motions thereof be onely by the redundancy of some external motions without us; nor how to find the First mover in nature; though we could find out that, yet we know that there is a Fatal determination which sits in all the wheels of meer Corporeal motion; neither can they exercise any such noble freedome as we constantly find in the Wills of men, which are as large and unbounded in all their Elections as Reason it self can represent Being it self to be.

10 *Lucretius*, that he might avoid the dint of this Argument, according to the *Genius* of his Sect feigns this *Liberty* to arise from a *Motion of declination*, whereby his *Atomes* alwaies moving downwards by their own weight towards the Centre of the World, are carried a little obliquely, as if they tended toward some point different from it, which he calls *clinamen principiorum*. Which riddle though it be as good as any else which they, who held the *Materiality* and *Mortality* of Souls in their own nature, can frame to salve this difficulty; yet it is of such a *private interpretation*, that I believe no *Oedipus* is able to expound it. But yet by what we may guesse at it, we shall easily find that this insolent conceit (and all else of this nature) destroys the *Freedome of Will*, more then any *Fate* which the severest censours thereof, whom he sometimes taxeth, ever set over it. For how can any thing be made subject to a free and impartial debate of Reason, or fall under the Level of Free-will, if all things be the meer result either of a Fortuitous or Fatal motion of Bodies, which can have no power or dominion over themselves? and why should he or his great Master find so much fault with the *Superstition* of the world, and condemn the Opinions of other men when they compare them with that transcendent sagacity they believe themselves to be the Lords of, if all was nothing else but the meer issue of *Material* motions; seeing that *necessity* which would arise from a *different concourse* and *motion* of several particles of

2 *Perpetuum mobile*] “perpetual motion”

14–15 *clinamen principiorum*] “deviations of the elementary particles”; *de rerum natura*, II, 292.

17 salve] In the sense of “explain” or “overcome”.

18 *Oedipus*] who, of course, solved the riddle of the sphinx.

25 his great Master] Epicurus.

Matter begetting that *diversity* of *Opinions* and *Wills*, would excuse them all from any blame?

Therefore to conclude this Argument, Whatsoever Essence finds this *Freedome* within it self, whereby it is absolved from the rigid laws of *Matter*, may know it self also to be *Immaterial*; and having dominion over its
 5 own actions, it will never desert it self: and because it finds it self *non vi alienâ sed suâ moveri*, as *Tully* argues, it feels it self able to preserve it self from the forrein force of *Matter*, and can say of all those assaults which are at any time made against those sorry mud-walls which in this
 10 life inclose it, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμὲ, as the *Stoick* did, all this is nothing to me, who am yet free and can command within, when this feeble Carkass is able no longer to obey me; and when that is shattered and broken down, I can live any where else without it; for I was not *That*, but had onely a command over *It*, while I dwelt in it.

15 But before we wholly desert this Head, we may adde some further strength to it, from the Observation of that Conflict which the Reasons and Understandings of men maintain against the *Sensitive appetite*: and wheresoever the Higher powers of Reason in man's Soul prevail not, but are vanquish'd by the impetuosity of their Sensual affections through
 20 own neglect of themselves; yet are they never so broken, but they may strengthen themselves again: and where they subdue not men's inordinate Passions and Affections, yet even there will they condemn them for them. Whereas were a Man all of one piece, and made up of nothing else

6–7 *non vi alienâ sed suâ moveri*] “to be moved not by some other power, but by its own”; adapted from *Tusculanae disputationes*, I.23.

10 οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμὲ] “it is nothing to me”

10 the *Stoick*] Epictetus, *Encheiridion*, I.1.

16–17 that Conflict which the Reasons and Understandings of men maintain against the *Sensitive appetite*] cf. Descartes, “The Passions of the Soul”, article 74: “And it is only in the repugnance of those motions, which the body by its spirits, and the Soul by her Wil, endeavour to excite at the same time in the kernell, that all the contestations which use to be imagined between the inferiour part of the Soul, called sensitive, and the superiour which is reasonable, or else between the naturall appetites and the Will, consist; for there is in us but only Soul only and this Soul hath no diversity of part sin it: the same which is sensible is rationally, and all her appetites are her Wills.” Descartes, *The Passions of the Soule*, p.38.

but *Matter*; these Corporeal motions could never check or controul themselves, these *Material* dimensions could not struggle with themselves, or by their own strength render themselves any thing else then what they are. But this ἀυτεξούσιος ζωή, as the Greeks call it, this *Self-potent Life*
 5 which is in the Soul of man, acting upon it self and drawing forth its own latent *Energie*, finds it self able to tame the outward man, and bring under those rebellious motions that arise from the meer *Animal powers*, and to tame and appease all those seditions and mutinies that it finds there. And if any can conceive all this to be nothing but a meer fighting of the
 10 *male-contented* pieces of *Matter* one against another, each striving for superiority and preeminence; I should not think it worth the while to teach such an one any higher learning, as looking upon him to be indued with no higher a Soul then that which moves in Beasts or Plants.

We shall now consider the Soul awhile in a further degree of *Abstraction*, and look at it in those *Actions* which *depend not at all upon the body*, wherein it doth τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν ἀσπάζεσθαι, as the Greeks speak, and converseth onely with its own Being. Which we shall first consider in those
 15 λόγοι μαθηματικοὶ or *Mathematical notions* which it conteins in it self, and sends forth from within it self; which as they are in themselves *Indivisible*, and of such a perfect nature as cannot be received or immersed into *Matter*;
 20 so they argue that *Subject* in which are seated to be of a true *Spiritual* and *Immaterial* nature. Such as *a pure Point*, *Linea ἀπλατῆς*, *Latitude abstracted from all Profundity*, *the Perfection of Figures*, *Æquality*, *Proportion*, *Symmetry and Asymmetry of Magnitudes*, *the Rise and propagation of Dimensions*, *Infinite divisibility*, and many such like things; which
 25

4 ἀυτεξούσιος ζωή] “autonomous life”

16 τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν ἀσπάζεσθαι] “embrace its own company”; Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, II, 110.

18 λόγοι μαθηματικοὶ] “mathematical ideas”

22 *Linea ἀπλατῆς*] “a line without breadth.”

4 the Greeks] St John of Damascus uses the phrase ἀυτεξούσιος ζωή in *Expositio Fidei*, II,23, when he speaks of the “voluntary or rational and independent life which constitutes our humanity”.

16 the Greeks] In this case, Proclus, in *Timaeo*, 173c, commenting on *Timaeus* 34b. Taylor translates: “the worthy man perceiving himself beautiful rejoices and is delighted, and producing in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an association with himself.” T. Taylor, *The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato*, II, p.110.

every ingenuous Son of that Art cannot but acknowledge to be the true characters of some *Immaterial* Being, seeing they were never buried in *Matter*, nor extracted out of it: and yet these are transcendently more certain and infallible Principles of Demonstration than any *Sensible* thing can be. There is no Geometrician but will acknowledge *Angular sections*, or the cutting of an *Arch* into any number of parts required, to be most exact without any diminution of the whole; but yet no Mechanical art can possibly perform either, but that the place of section will detract something from the whole. If any one should endeavour to double a *Cube*, as the *Delian* Oracle once commanded the *Athenians*, requiring them to duplicate the dimensions of *Apollo's* Altar, by any Mechanicall subtilty; he would find it as impossible as they did, and be as much laugh'd at for his pains as some of their Mechanicks were. If therefore no *Matter* be capable of any Geometrical effections, and the *Apodictical* precepts of Geometry be

5 *Angular sections*] “the dividing of angles into some number of equal parts; as, to bisect, or to trisect an angle, &c.” C. Hutton, *A Philosophical and Mathematical Dictionary*, p.121.

14 *Apodictical*] “of clear demonstration; established incontrovertibly;” the first use recorded by the OED.

1–3 the true character ... extracted out of it] cf. More's account; “there are a multitude of *Relative Notions* or *Ideas* in the Mind of Man, as well *Mathematical* as *Logical*, which ... cannot be the Impresses of any material Object from without ... Such are these, *Cause*, *Effect*, *Whole* and *Part*, *Like* and *Unlike*, and the rest. So *Equality* and *Inequality*, *λόγος* and *ἀναλογία*, *Proportion* and *Analogy*, *Symmetry* and *Assymetry*, and such like: All which *Relative Ideas* I shall easily prove to be no material Impresses from without upon the Soul, but her own active Conception proceeding from herself whilst she takes notice of *external Objects*.” More, *A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings*, p.18.

9–13 as the *Delian* Oracle ... their Mechanicks were] The citizens of Delos approached the Oracle at Delphi, because they were suffering from a plague sent by Apollo. The oracle told them that to rid themselves of their troubles they must double the size of the altar to Apollo, which was a cube. Plutarch tells the story of how the Delians, having “failed absurdly constructing the altar”, met Plato in Caria and asked him for a solution. Plato explained that “the god was rallying the Greeks for their neglect of education, deriding, as it were, our ignorance and bidding us engage in no perfunctory study of geometry”, and that he “was ordering the entire Greek nation to give up war and its miseries and cultivate the Muses, and by calming their passions through the practice of discussion and study of mathematics, so to live with one that their intercourse should be not injurious, but profitable.” cf. *de genio Socratis*, 579b-d. A copy of Johann Molther's *Problema Deliacum, De Cubi Duplicatione*, which contains a history of the problem and claims to solve it by neusis construction, was amongst the works left by Smith to the Library of Queens' College, Cambridge. Molther, *Problem Deliacum, De Cubi Duplicatione*.

altogether unimitable in the purest Matter that Phansie can imagine; then must they needs depend upon something infinitely more pure then *Matter*, which hath all that *Stability* and *Certainty* within its self which it gives to those infallible Demonstrations.

- 5 We need not here dispute with *Empedocles*,
 Γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, &c.
We know earth by earth, fire by fire, and water by water, that is, by the Archetypal *Idea*'s of all things in our own Souls; though it may be it were no hard matter to prove that, as in this case S. *Austin* did, when in his
 10 Book *de Quant. Animæ*, he would prove the Immortality of the Soul from these notions of Quantity, which come not by any possible Sense or Experience which we can make of bodily Being, and therefore concludes they must needs be immediately ingraven upon an Immaterial Soul. For though we could suppose our *Senses* to be the School-Dames that first
 15 taught us the Alphabet of this learning; yet nothing else but a true Mental Essence could be capable of it, or so much improve it as to *unbody* it all, and strip it naked of any Sensible garment, and then onely, when it hath done it, embrace it as its own, and commence a true and perfect understanding of it. And as we all hold it impossible to shrink up any Material
 20 Quality, which will perpetually spread it self commensurably to the Matter it is in, into a Mathematical point: so is it much more impossible to extend and stretch forth any Immaterial and unbodied Quality or notion according to the dimensions of *Matter*, and yet to preserve the integrity of its own nature.

6 Γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, &c.] The entire quotation translates: "We see Earth by means of Earth, Water by means of Water, divine Air by means of Air, and destructive Fire means of Fire; Affection by means of Affection, Hate by means of baneful Hate." Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, p.63. Smith's source is probably Aristotle, *de anima*, I.2.404b; cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, VI, 30. Fragment 109 in Diehls, *Die Fragmente Der Vor-Sokratiker*, I, p.351.

5 *Empedocles*] Empedocles (c.490-430 BC) was one of the pre-Socratic philosophers. He believed that everything was composed of the four elements, fire, air, water and earth.

9 S. *Austin* did] St Augustine's argument is in *de quantitate animae*, I,IV.10 - XIII.22 (Cols. 1041-47 in *Patrologia Latina*, 32.

14-15 the School-Dames that first taught us the Alphabet of this learning] Dame schools were provided a basic elementary education.

Besides, in these *Geometricall* speculations we find that our Souls will not consult with our Bodies, or ask any leave of our Fancies how or how far they shall distribute their own notions by a continued progress of Invention; but spending upon their own stock, are most free and liberal, and make Fancie onely to serve their own purpose in painting out not what Matter will afford a copie of, but what they themselves will dictate to it; and if that should be too busie, silence and controul it by their own Imperial laws. They so little care for *Matter* in this kind of work, that they banish it as far as may be from themselves, or else chastise and tame the unruly and refractory nature of it, that it should yield it self pliable to their sovereign commands. These *Embodied Bodies* (for so this present Argument will allow me to call them) which our Senses converse with, are perpetually justling together, contending so irresistably each for its own room and space to be in, and will not admit of any other into it, preserving their own intervals: but when they are once in their *Unbodied nature* entertained into the Mind, they can easily penetrate one another ὅλα δι' ὅλα. The Soul can easily pyle the vastest number up together in her self, and by her own force sustain them all, and make them all couch together in the same space: she can easily pitch up all those *Five Regular Bodies* together in her own Imagination, and inscribe them one in another, and then entering into the very heart and centre of them, discern all their Properties and several Respects one to another; and thus easily find her self freed from all Material and Corporeal confinement; shewing how all that which we call *Body*, rather issued forth by an infinite projection from some *Mind*, then that it should exalt it self into the nature of any Mental Being; and,

16 ὅλα δι' ὅλα.] lit. "all through all"; "entirely"

13–14 perpetually justling together, contending so irresistably each for its own room and space to be in, and will not admit of any other into it] cf. Cudworth's assertion that it is "an *Essential Property*" of matter "to be Antitypous or Impenetrable, that is, to Justle or Shoulder out, all other *Extended Substance* from *Penetrating* into it, and *Co-Existing* with it, so as to Possess and take up the same Room or Space" Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.829.

19 *Five Regular Bodies*] Tetrahedron, hexahedron, octahedron, dodecahedron and icosahedron. Their main antecedents, both Platonic and Pythagorean, are discussed in Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics*, I, p.158ff.

as the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans* have long since well observed, how our Bodies should rather be in our Souls, then our Souls in them. And so I have done with that Particular.

And now we have traced *the Immortality of the Soul*, before we were
 5 aware, through those Three Relations or σχέσεις, or (if you will) Degrees of knowledge, which *Proclus* in his Comment on *Plato's Timæus* hath attributed to it, which he calls τῶν γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων σειράν. The First is αἰσθησις ἄλογος, a naked perception of Sensible impressions, without any work of Reason. The Second, δόξα μετὰ λόγου, a Miscellaneous kind of
 10 knowledge arising of a collation its Sensations with its own more obscure and dark *Idea's*. The third, δiάνοια καὶ λόγος, Discourse and Reason, which the *Platonists* describe Mathematical knowledge by, which, because it spins out its own notions by a constant *series* of Deduction, knitting up Consequences one upon another by Demonstrations, is by him call'd νο-
 15 ῆσις μεταβατικῆ, a Progressive kind of knowledge; to which he addes a Fourth, which shall now make use of for a further Proof of *the Immortality of the Soul*. There is therefore Fourthly νόησις ἀμεταβάτως, which is a naked intuition of Eternal Truth which is alwaies the same, which never rises nor sets, but alwaies stands still in its Vertical, and fills the whole

5 σχέσεις] “states”

7 τῶν γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων σειράν] “series of knowing powers”

8 αἰσθησις ἄλογος,] “unreasoning sensation”

9 δόξα μετὰ λόγου,] “opinion following reason”

11 δiάνοια καὶ λόγος,] “thought and reason”

14–15 νόησις μεταβατικῆ,] “transitional reasoning”

17 νόησις ἀμεταβάτως] “reasoning without transition”

1–2 how our Bodies should rather be in our Souls, then our Souls in them] cf. Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV.3.22, commending the wisdom of Plato “when, in treating of the All, he puts the body in its soul and not its soul in the body”. The original statement by Plato is in *Timæus*, 24b.

6–7 which *Proclus* in his Comment on *Plato's Timæus* hath attributed to it] Taylor's translation of the relevant passage (76c) reads: “In this, therefore, the series of gnostic powers is terminated, of which indeed intelligence is the leader, which is above reason, and is without transition. But reason has the second order which is the intelligence of our soul, transitively coming into contact with real beings. Opinion has the third order, being a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason. And sense has the fourth order, being an irrational knowledge of sensibles.” T. Taylor, *The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timæus of Plato*, I,p.207.

Horizon of the Soul with a mild and gentle light. There are such calm and serene *Idea's* of Truth, that shine onely in *pacate* Souls, and cannot be discerned by any *troubled* or fluid Fancy, that necessarily prove a μόνικον καὶ στάσιμόν τι, *some Permanent & Stable Essence* in the Soul of man, which (as *Simplicius* on *Epictet.* well observes) ariseth onely ἀπὸ ἀκινήτου τινός, καὶ κατὰ πρότον ἀμεταβλήτου αἰτίας, τῆς ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἔχουσης, *from some immoveable and unchangeable Cause which is alwaies the same.* For these Operations about Truth we now speak of, are not χρονικαὶ ἐνέργειαι any *Chronical Energies*, as he further expresses it, but the true badges of an Eternal nature, and speak a ταυτότης and στάσις (as *Plato* is wont to phrase it) in man's Soul. Such are the *Archetypall Idea's* of *Justice, Wisdome, Goodness, Truth, Eternity, Omnipotency*, and all those either *Morall, Physicall, or Metaphysical* notions, which are either the *First Principles* of Science, or the *Ultimate* complement and final perfection of it. These we alwaies find to be *the same*, and know that no Exorcisms of Material mutations have any power over them: though we our selves are but of yesterday, and mutable every moment, yet these are *Eternall*, and depend not upon any mundane vicissitudes; neither could we ever gather them from our observation of any Material thing where they were never sown.

3–4 μόνικον καὶ στάσιμόν τι,] “something stable and steadfast”

5–7 ἀπὸ ἀκινήτου τινός, καὶ κατὰ πρότον ἀμεταβλήτου αἰτίας, τῆς ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἔχουσης] “from something unmoved, and responsible from the first, which is always true to itself and purposive”; H. Wolf, *Simplicii Commentarius In Enchiridion Epicteti: Ex Libris veteribus emendatus*, p.231.; cf. “the source is some cause which is unmoved and absolutely unchanged, which always holds itself the same and in the same state” Brittain and Brennan, *Simplicius: On Epictetus Handbook 27-53*, p.72.

9 χρονικαὶ ἐνέργειαι] “temporal activities”; adapted from Simplicius, H. Wolf, *Simplicii Commentarius In Enchiridion Epicteti: Ex Libris veteribus emendatus*, p.231.

10 ταυτότης] “sameness” or “identity”

10 στάσις] “rest” or “stability”

2 *pacate*] appeased, pacified, assuaged

10–11 as *Plato* is wont to phrase it] Although the language Smith quotes is certainly Platonic (cf. *Parmenides*, 159-160, *Sophist*, 250ff), it is perhaps more characteristic of Plotinus, who uses the terms frequently, speaking, for example, of the soul's “identity with god” (I,2,5), and of “form” as “matter's rest and a kind of quietness” (IV,3,5). Indeed, immediately before the passage next quoted by Smith, Plotinus speaks of his “rest in the divine.” Both terms occur also in Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus*, another plausible intermediary.

If we reflect but upon our own Souls, how manifestly doe the *Species* of *Reason*, *Freedome*, *Perception*, and the like, offer themselves to us, whereby we may *know* a thousand times *more distinctly* what our *Souls* are then what our *Bodies* are? For the former we know by an immediate converse with our selves, and a distinct sense of their Operations; whereas all our knowledge of the Body is little better then meerly Historically, which we gather up by scraps and piecemeals from more doubtfull and uncertain experiments which we make of them: but the notions which we have of a *Mind*, *i.e.* something within us that *thinks*, *apprehends*, *reasons*, and *discourses*, are so clear and distinct from all those notions which we can fasten upon a *Body*, that we can easily conceive that if all *Body-Being* in the world were destroyed, yet we might then as well subsist as now we doe. For whensoever we take notice of those *Immediate notions* of our own *Minds* whereby they make themselves known to us, we find no such thing in them as *Extension* or *Divisibility*, which are contained in every Corporeal essence: and having no such thing discovered to us from our nearest familiarity with our own Souls, we could never so easily know whether they had any such things as Bodies joyned to them or not, did not those extrinsical impressions that their turbulent motions make upon them admonish them thereof.

But as the more we reflect upon our own Minds, we find all Intelligible things more clear, (as when we look up to the Heavens, we see all things more bright and radiant, then when we look down upon this dark Earth when the Sun-beams are drawn away from it:) so when we see all Intelligible Being concentring together in a great *Oneness*, and all kind of *Multiplicity* running more and more into the strictest *Unity*, till at last we find all *Variety* and *Division* suck'd up into a perfect *Simplicity*, where all happily conspire together in the most undivided peace and friendship; we then easily perceive that the reason of all *Diversity* and *Distinction* is (that I may use *Plotinus* his words not much differently from his meaning) μετάβασις ἀπὸ νοῦ εἰς λογισμὸν. For though in our contentious pursuits

31 μετάβασις ἀπὸ νοῦ εἰς λογισμὸν] “a migration from intellect to reasoning”; adapted from *Enneads*, IV.8,1. For HGW’s note on what he regards as a “misquotation from memory”, see John Smith, *Select Discourses*, pp.99-100.

31 μετάβασις ἀπὸ νοῦ εἰς λογισμὸν] The words occur in the context of Plotinus’ account

after Science, we cast *Wisdom*, *Power*, *Eternity*, *Goodness* and the like into several formalities, that so we may trace down Science in a constant chain of Deductions; yet in our naked Intuition and visions of them, we clearly discern that *Goodness* and *Wisdom* lodge together, *Justice* and *Mercy* kiss each other: and all these, and whatsoever pieces else the crack'd glasses of our Reasons may sometimes break Divine and Intelligible Being into, are fast knit up together in the invincible bonds of *Eternity*. And in this sense is that notion of *Proclus* descanting upon *Plato's* riddle of the Soul, [ὡς γεννητὴ καὶ ἀγέννητος, *as if it were generated & yet not generated*] to be understood; χρόνος ἅμα καὶ αἰὼν τὴν ψυχὴν, the Soul partaking of *Time* in its broken and particular conceptions and apprehensions, and of *Eternity* in its comprehensive and stable contemplations I need not say that when the Soul is once got up to the top of this bright *Olympus*, it will then no more doubt of its own *Immortality*, or fear any *Dissipation*, or doubt whether any drowsie *Sleep* shall hereafter seize upon it: no, it will then feel it self grasping fast and safely its own *Immortality*, and view it self in the Horizon of *Eternity*. In such sober kind of *Ecstasies* did *Plotinus* find his own Soul separated from his Body, as if it had divorc'd it for a time from it self: πολλάκις ἐγυρόμενος εἰς ἔμαντον ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ γενόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔξω. ἔμαντοῦ δὲ εἶσω, θαυμαστὸν ἐλίκον ὁρῶν κάλλος, &c. /

4–5 *Goodness* and *Wisdom* lodge together, *Justice* and *Mercy* kiss each other] cf. Psalms, 85, 10: “Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other.”

9 ὡς γεννητὴ καὶ ἀγέννητος] “as if begotten and not begotten”; cf. *Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus*, 177f; *Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, II, p.124. The references are to *Proclus' commentary on Timaeus*, 35a.

10 χρόνος ἅμα καὶ αἰὼν τὴν ψυχὴν,] “both time and eternity are around the soul”; cf. *Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus*, 178a; *Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, II, p.125.

19–20 πολλάκις ἐγυρόμενος εἰς ἔμαντον ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ γενόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔξω. ἔμαντοῦ δὲ εἶσω, θαυμαστὸν ἐλίκον ὁρῶν κάλλος, &c.] “Often I have woken up out of the body to my self and have entered into, going out from all other things; I have seen beauty wonderfully great.” cf. *Enneads*, IV.8.1.

of how he has “woken up out of the body” and then come down from that “rest in the divine”. It is an important passage for Smith, to which he recurs.

9 [] Text contained in square brackets I take to have been inserted by Worthington.

19–20 πολλάκις ἐγυρόμενος εἰς ἔμαντον ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ γενόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔξω. ἔμαντοῦ δὲ εἶσω, θαυμαστὸν ἐλίκον ὁρῶν κάλλος, &c.] *Plotinus* goes on: “and felt assurance that then most of all I belonged to the better part; I have actually lived the best life and come to identity with the divine; and set firm in it I have come to that supreme actu-

being often awakened into a sense of my self, and being sequestred from my body, and betaking my self from all things into my self; what admirable beauty did I then behold, &c. as he himself tells us, *En.4.1.8.c.1*. Thus is that *Intelligence* begotten which *Proclus 1.2. in Plat. Tim.* calls a *Correction of Science*: his notion is worth our taking notice of, and gives us in a manner a brief recapitulation of our former discourse, shewing how the higher we ascend in the contemplation of the Soul, the higher still we rise above this low sphere of Sense and Matter. His words are these, Ἀὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὡς μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἀνέλεγκτός ἐστιν, ἐλέγχεται δ' ἀπὸ νοῦ, &c. that is,

5 Science as it is in the Soul (by which he means the Discursive power of it) is blameless, but yet is corrected by the Mind; as resolving that which is Indivisible, and dividing Simple Being as if it were Compounded: as Fancy corrects Sense for discerning with passion and material mixture, from which that purifies its object; Opinion corrects Fancies, because it apprehends things by forms and phantasms, which it self is above; and Science corrects Opinion, because it knows without discerning of causes; and the Mind (as was insinuated) or the Intuitive faculty corrects the Scientific, because by a Progressive kind of Analysis it divides the Intelligible Object, where it self knows and sees things together in their undivided essence:

10 wherefore this onely is Immoveable, and Science or Scientific reason is inferiour to it in the knowledge of true Being, Thus he.

15

20

8–9 Ἀὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὡς μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἀνέλεγκτός ἐστιν, ἐλέγχεται δ' ἀπὸ νοῦ, &c.] Taylor translates: “For science itself, as subsisting in souls, is indeed irreprehensible, but is reprehended by intellect, for evolving that which is impartible, and apprehending that which is simple in a composite manner. For the phantasy also reprehends sense, because its knowledge is in conjunction with passion, according to a commixture, from which the phantasy is purified. But opinion reprehends the phantasy because its knowledge is attended with type and morphe, from which opinion is free. Science reprehends opinion, because its knowledge is without the explanation of cause, by which science is especially bound. And intellect as we have said, reprehends science, because it transitively divides the object of knowledge, but intellect knows at once the whole in conjunction with essence. Hence intellect is alone unconquerable, but science, and scientific discourse, are vanquished by intellect, according to the knowledge of being.” Proclus, *Commentary on the “Timaeus”*, 104d; T. Taylor, *The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato*; Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, I, p.343.

ality, setting myself above all else in the realm of Intellect.” Saveson acutely represents the difference between Smith and Henry More with reference to this passage; Saveson, “Differing Reactions to Descartes Among the Cambridge Platonists”, p.566.

But here we must use some caution, lest we should arrogate too much to the power of our own Souls, which indeed cannot raise up themselves into that *pure and steady contemplation* of true Being; but will rather act with some *Multiplicity* or *ἑτερότης* (as they speak) attending it. But thus
 5 much of its high original may appear to us, that it can (as our Author told us) *correct* it self, for *dividing* and *disjoyning* therein, as knowing all to be every way *One* most *entire* and *simple*: though yet all men cannot easily improve their own Understandings to this High degree of Comprehension; and therefore all ancient Philosophers and *Aristotle* himself made it the
 10 peculiar privilege of some men more abstracted from themselves and all corporeal commerce.

And now that we may conclude the Argument in hand, we shall add but this one thing further to clear the Soul's *Immortality*, and it is indeed that which breeds a true sense of it, viz. *True and real goodness*. Our
 15 *highest speculations* of the Soul may beget a sufficient conviction thereof within us, but yet it is onely *True Goodness and Vertue* in the Souls of men that can make them both *know* and *love*, *believe* and *delight* themselves in their *own Immortality*. Though every good man is not so Logically subtle as to be able by fit *mediums* to demonstrate his own Immortality, yet
 20 he sees it in a higher light: His Soul being purged and enlightened by true Sanctity is more capable of those Divine irradiations, whereby it feels it self in conjunction with God, and by a *συνάυγεια* (as the Greeks speak) the Light of divine goodness mixing it self with the light of its own Reason, sees more clearly: not onely that it may, if it please the supreme Deity,

4 ἑτερότης] "otherness"; see, for one example among many, Plotinus' use of the idea in *Enneads*, 4.3.10.

22 συνάυγεια] "meeting of the rays of sight from the eye"; cf. *Timaeus*, 45c, and Plato's opinion "that the sight is the *splendor of united rays*; there is a light which reaches some distance from the eyes into a congruous air, and there is likewise a light emitted from bodies, which meets and is joined with the fiery visual light in the intermediate air (which is liquid and mutable); and the conjunction of these rays gives the sense of seeing." This is Plato's "*corradiancy, or splendor of united rays*," as recounted by Plutarch. *de placitis philosophorum*, 4.13. Italics translate the term in question.

5 our Author] Proclus

24 sees more clearly] 1 Corinthians 13, 12 sits behind the whole passage: "For now we see through a glasse, darkely: but then face to face: now I know in part, but then shall I know euen as also I am knowen."

of its own nature exist eternally, but also that it shall doe so: it knows it shall never be deserted of that free Goodness that alwaies embraceth it: it knows that Almighty Love, which it lives by, to be stronger then death, and more powerful then the grave ; it will not suffer those holy ones that are
 5 partakers of it to lie in hell, or their Souls to see corruption; and though worms may devour their flesh, and putrefaction enter into those bones that sence it, yet it knows that its Redeemer lives, and that it shall at last see him with a pure Intellectual eye, which will then be clear and bright, when all that earthly dust, which converse with this mortal body filled it
 10 with, shall be wiped out: It knows that God will never forsake his own life , which he hath quickned in it; he will never deny those ardent desires of a blissfull fruition of himself, which the lively sense of his own Goodness hath excited within it: those breathings and gaspings after an eternal participation of him are but the Energy of his own breath within us; if he had
 15 any mind to destroy it, he would never have shewn it such things as he hath done; he would not raise it up to such *Mounts of Vision*, to shew it all the glory of that heavenly *Canaan* flowing with eternal and unbounded pleasures, and then tumble it down again into that deep and darkest Abyss of Death and Non-entity. Divine goodness cannot, it will not, be so
 20 cruel to holy souls that are such ambitious suitors for his love. The more they contemplate the blissfull Effluxes of his divine love upon themselves,

3–4 stronger then death, and more powerful then the grave] cf. Song of Solomon, 8,6: “Set mee as a seale vpon thine heart, as a seale vpon thine arme: for loue is strong as death, iealousie is cruel as the graue: the coales thereof are coales of fire, which hath a most vehement flame..”

4–5 it will not suffer those holy ones that are partakers of it to lie in hell, or their Souls to see corruption] cf. Acts, 2, 27: “Because thou wilt not leaue my soule in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy one to see corruption.”; cf. also Acts 2, 31.

7–8 it knows that its Redeemer lives, and that it shall at last see him with a pure Intellectual eye] cf. Job, 19, 25-7: “For I know that my Redeemer liueth, and that he shall stand at the latter day, vpon the earth: And though after my skin wormes destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God. Whom I shal see for my selfe, and mine eyes shall beholde, and not another, though my reines bee consumed within me.”

10 will never forsake his own life] cf. Hebrews 13, 5: “Let your conuersation bee without couetousnesse: and be content with such things as yee haue. For hee hath said, I will neuer leaue thee, nor forsake thee.”

17–18 that heavenly *Canaan* flowing with eternal and unbounded pleasures] cf. amongst many verses, Exodus 3, 17: “”And I haue said, I will bring you vp out of the affliction of Egypt, vnto the land of the Canaanites, and the Hittites, and the Amorites, and the Perizzites, and the Hiuites, and the lebusites, vnto a land flowing with milke and hony”.

the more they find themselves strengthened with an undaunted confidence in him; and look not upon themselves in these poor bodily relations and dependences, but in their eternal alliances, ὡς κόσμοι, ὡς υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, (as *Arrianus* sometimes speaks) as the Sons of God who is the Father
 5 of Souls, Souls that are able to live any where in this spacious Universe, and better out of this dark and lonesome Cell of Bodily matter, which is alwaies checking and clogging them in their noble motions, then in it: as knowing that when they leave this Body, they shall then be received into everlasting habitations, and converse freely and familiarly with that
 10 Source of Life and Spirit which they conversed with in this life in a poor disturbed and streightned manner. It is indeed nothing else that makes men question the Immortality of their Souls, so much as *their own base and earthly loves*, which *first* makes them *wish* their Souls were not immortal, and then to *think* they are not: which *Plotinus* hath well observed,
 15 and accordingly hath soberly pursued this argument.

I cannot omit a large recital of his Discourse, which tends so much to disparage that flat and dull Philosophy which these later Ages have brought forth; as also those heavy-spirited Christians that find so little divine life and activity in their own Souls as to imagine them to fall into such a
 20 dead sleep as soon as they leave this earthly tabernacle, that they cannot be awakened again, till that last Trumpet and the voice of an Archangel shall rouse them up. Our Authors discourse is his, *Enn.4.lib.7.c.10.* having

3 ὡς κόσμοι, ὡς υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ] “as citizens of the world, as sons of god”; adapted from Epictetus, *Discourses*, 1.9.6.

8–9 be received into everlasting habitations] cf. Luke, 16,9: “And I say vnto you, Make to your selues friends of the Mammon of vnrighteousnesse, that when ye faile, they may receiue you into euerlasting habitations”.

20 this earthly tabernacle] cf. 2 Corinthians 5, 1: “For we know, that if our earthly house of this Tabernacle were dissolued, wee haue a building of God, an house not made with hand, eternall in the heauens.”

21–22 last Trumpet and the voice of an Archangel shall rouse them up] cf., for example, 1 Thessalonians 4, 16: “For the Lord himselfe shall descend from heauen with a shout, with the voyce of the Archangel, and with the trumpe of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first.”

22 Our Authors discourse is his, *Enn.4.lib.7.c.10.*] *Enneads*, IV 7.10.

4 *Arrianus*] *Arrianus*’ compilation of Epictetus’ *Discourses* was written about 108 AD, probably from lecture notes.

22 Our Authors discourse is his, *Enn.4.lib.7.c.10.*] *Armstrong* translates the relevant

first premised this principle, *That every Divine thing is immortall*, λάβωμεν δὲ ψυχὴν, μὴ τὴν ἐντοῦ σώματι, &c. *Let us now consider a Soul (saith he) not such an one as is immerst into the Body, having contracted unreasonable Concupiscence and Anger (ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν, according to which they*
 5 *were wont to distinguish between the Irascible and Concupiscible faculty) and other Passions; but such a one as hath cast away these, and as little as may be communicates with the Body: such a one as this will sufficiently manifest that all Vice is unnaturall to the Soul, and something acquired onely from abroad; and that the best Wisdome and all other Vertues lodge*
 10 *in a purged Soul, as being allyed to it. If therefore such a Soul shall reflect*

4 ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν] “desire and anger”

passage: “Let us take soul, not the soul in body which has acquired irrational desires and passions and admitted other affection, but the soul which has wiped these away and which, as far as possible, has no communion with the body. This soul does make it clear that its evils are external accretions to the soul and come from elsewhere, but that when it is purified the best things are present in it, wisdom and all the rest of virtue, and are its own. If, then, the soul is something of this kind when it goes up again to itself, it must surely belong to that nature which we assert is that of all the divine and eternal. For wisdom and true virtue are divine things, and could not occur in some trivial mortal being, but something of such a kind [as to possess them] must be divine, since it has a share in divine things through its kinship and consubstantiality. For this reason any one of us who is like this would deviate very little from the beings above as far as his soul itself was concerned and would only be inferior by that part which is in body. For this reason, if every man was like this, or there were a great number who had souls like this, no one would be so unbelieving as not to believe that what is soul in men is altogether immortal. But, as it is, they see the soul in the great majority of people damaged in many ways, and do not think of it as if it was divine or immortal. But when one consider the nature of any particular thing one must concentrate on its pure form, since what is added is always a hindrance to the knowledge of that to which it has been added. Consider it by stripping, or rather let the man who has stripped look at himself and believe himself to be immortal, when he looks at himself as he come tone in the intelligible and the pure. For he will see an intellect which sees nothing perceived by the senses, none of these mortal things, but apprehends the eternal by its eternity, and all the things in the intelligible world, having become itself an intelligible universe full of light, illuminated by the truth from the Good, which radiates truth over all intelligibles; so he will often think that this was very well said: ‘Greetings, I am for you an immortal god’ having ascended to the divine and concentrating wholly on likeness to it. But if purification causes us to be in a state of knowledge of the best, then the sciences which lie within become apparent, the ones which really are sciences. For it is certainly not by running around outside the soul ‘sees self-control and justice’, but itself by itself in its understanding of itself and what it formerly was.”

upon it self, how shall it not appear to it self to be of such a kind of nature as Divine and Eternall Essences are? For Wisdome and true Vertue being Divine Effluxes can never enter into any unhallowed and mortall thing: it must therefore needs be Divine, seeing it is fill'd with a Divine nature διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον by its kindred and consanguinity therewith. Whoever therefore amongst us is such a one differs but little in his Soul from Angelicall essences; and that little is the present inhabitation in the Body, in which he is inferiour to them. And if every man were of this raised temper, or any considerable number had but such holy Souls, there would be no such Infidels as would in any sort disbelieve the Soul's Immortality. But now the vulgar sort of men beholding the Souls of the generality so mutilated and deform'd with Vice and Wickedness, they cannot think of the Soul as of any Divine and Immortall Being, though indeed they ought to judge of things as they are in their own naked essences, and not with respect to that which extraessentially adheres to them; which is the great prejudice of knowledge. Contemplate therefore the Soul of man, denuding it of all that which it self is not, or let him that does this view his own Soul; then he will believe it to be Immortall, when he shall behold it ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ, fixt in an Intelligible and pure nature; he shall then behold his own Intellect contemplating not any Sensible thing, but Eternall things, with that which is Eternall, that is, with it self, looking into the Intellectual world, being it self made all Lucid, Intellectuall, and shining with the Sun-beams of eternall Truth, borrowed from the First Good, which perpetually rayeth forth his Truth upon all Intellectual Beings. One thus qualified may seem without any arrogance to take up that saying of Empedocles, Χαίρετ', ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος - Farewell all earthly allies, I am henceforth no mortall wight, but an Immortall Angel, ascending up into Divinity, and reflecting upon that likeness of it which I find in my self. When true Sanctity and Purity shall ground him in the knowledge of divine things, then shall the inward Sciences, that arise from the bottome of his own Soul, display themselves; which indeed are the onely true Sciences: for the Soul runs out of it self to behold Temperance and Justice abroad, but its own light sees them in the contemplation of its own Being, and that divine essence which was before enshrined within it self.

4–5 διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον] “through kinship and the sameness of being”

18–19 ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ] “in the intelligible and the pure”

26 Χαίρετ', ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος] “greeting! I am to you an immortal god”; Fragment B 112 Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, p.215.

I might after all this adde many more reasons for a further confirmation of this present *Thesis*, which are as numerous as the Soul's relations & productions themselves are; but to every one who is willing to doe his own Soul right, this Evidence we have already brought in is more then
5 sufficient.

Having done with the several Proofs of the Soul's Immortality (that great Principle of Naturall Theology, which if it be not entertain'd as a *Communis Notitia*, as I doubt not but that it is by the Vulgar sort of men, or as an Axiome, or, if you will, a Theoreme of free and impartial Reason,
10 all endeavours in Religion will be very cool and languid) it may not be amiss to enquire a little concerning *His* opinion whom so many take for the great Intelligencer of Nature and Omniscient Oracle of Truth ; though it be too manifest that he hath so defaced the sacred Monuments of the

6 Having done with the several Proofs of the Soul's Immortality] Worthington's chapter heading describes this section as "*An Appendix containing an Enquiry into the Sense of Opinion of Aristotle concerning the Immortality of the Soul.*" Its insertion does, however, obscure Smith's line of thought.

11–12 *His* opinion whom so many take for the great Intelligencer of Nature and Omniscient Oracle of Truth] Aristotle was still a pre-eminent figure in 17th century Cambridge. Culverwel, for example, calls him "that learned Philosopher" or just "the Philosopher" (Culverwel, *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature*, pp. 18, 19, 22, 30, 50, 65, 67 etc.). Few expressed their doubts so strongly as Smith; Cudworth, for instance, while finding in Aristotle's expression "too much of Sceptism", eventually preferred his system to the "Cartesian *Hypothesis*", and commended him for maintaining "a Perfect Incorporeal Intellect to be the Head of all", a Nature acting "for Ends and Purposes, though unknown to itself", "the Naturality of Morality", and "Autexoiousie, or Liberty from Necessity" (Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.55).

13–1 he hath so defaced the sacred Monuments of the ancient Metaphysical Theology by his profane hands] For Cudworth's later assertion of a "System of Philosophy ... consisting of the Doctrine of *Incorporeal substance* (whereof God is the Head) together with the *Atomical* and *Mechanical Physiology*", once "Genuine, Perfect and Complete", which "after a while ... came to be *Mangled* and *Dismembred*, some taking one Part of it alone, and some another; some snatching away the *Atomical Physiology*. without the *Pneumatology* and *Theology*; and other ... taking the *Theology* and *Doctrine of Incorporeals*, without the *Atomical* or *Mechanical Physiology*. The former ... were *Democritus*, *Leucippus*, and *Protagoras*, ... the latter *Plato* and *Aristotle*, who indeed took the better Part, the *Soul*, *Spirit* and *Quintessence* of it", see Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, pp.51ff. The most recent study is Levitin, *Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science*, pp. 355-368.

ancient Metaphysical Theology by his profane hands, that it is hard to see that lovely face of Truth which was once engraven upon them (as some of his own Interpreters have long ago observed) and so blurr'd those fair Copies of divine learning which he received from his Predecessors, that his later Interpreters (who make him all their All) are as little sometime acquainted with his meaning and design, as they are with that Elder philosophy which he so corrupts: which indeed is the true reason they are so ambiguous in determining his Opinion of *the Soul's Immortality*; which yet he often asserts and demonstrates in his Three Books *de Anima*. We shall not here traverse this *Notion* through them all, but onely briefly take notice of that which hath made his Expositours stumble so much in this point; the main whereof is that *Definition* which he gives of the *Soul*, wherein he seems to make nothing else for the *Genus* of it, but an *Entelechia* or *Informative thing*, which spends all its virtue upon that Matter which it informs, and cannot act any other way then meerly by *information*; being indeed nothing else but some Material εἶδος, like an impression in wax which cannot subsist without it, or else the result of it: whence it is that he calls onely either *Material Forms*, or the Functions and Operations of those Forms, by this name. But indeed he intended not this for a *general* Definition of the Soul of man, and therefore after he had lai'd down this *particular* Definition of the Soul, *lib.2.cap.1.* he tells us expressly That that which we call the *Rational Soul* is χωριστή or *separable from the Body*, διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελέχειαν, *because it is not the Entelech of any Body*. Which he laies down the demonstra-

27 *Entelechia*] "*Entelechia*, (Gr.) an inward Soul or Power, to move or act" Blount, *Glossographia*; "soul is the first actuality (ἐντελέχεια) of a natural body having in it the capacity of life"; *de anima*, II, 1, 412a.

29 εἶδος] "that which is seen", hence "form"; *de anima*, II.1.412a.

29–30 like an impression in wax] cf. "there is no need to enquire whether soul and body are one, any more than whether the wax and the imprint are one;" *de anima*, II, 1, 412b.

35 χωριστή] "separable"; cf. *de anima*, II, 1, 413a.

36 διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελέχειαν] "not the actualities of any body whatever" *de anima*, II, 1, 413a

33 *general* Definition of the Soul of man] cf. "It has now been stated in general terms what soul is, namely, substance as notion or form"; *de anima*, II, 1, 412b

36 διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελέχειαν] This misrepresents Aristotle somewhat. In context, the text reads: "Now it needs no proof that the soul - or if it is divisible into parts, certain of its parts - cannot be separated from the body, for there are cases where the actuality belongs to the parts themselves. There is, however, no reason why some

tion of in several places of all those Three books, by enquiring εἰ ἔστι τὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, as he speaks, *lib.1.cap.1. whether the Soul hath any proper function or operation of its own*, or whether all be compounded and result from the Soul and Body together: and in
 5 this inquirie finding that all *Sensations* and *Passions* arise as well from the *Body* as from the *Soul*, and spring out of the conjunction of both of them (which he therefore calls ἔνυλοι λόγοι, as being begotten by the Soul upon the Body) he concludes that all this savours of nothing else but a *Material nature, inseparable* from the *Body*. But then finding acts of Mind and
 10 Understanding, which cannot be propagated from *Matter*, or *causally* depend upon the *Body*, he resolves the Principles from whence they flow to be *Immortal*; which he thus sets down *lib.2.cap.2.περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως, οὐδέπω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, &c.* that is, *Now as for the Mind and Theoreticall power, it appears not, viz.*
 15 that they belong to that Soul which in the former Chapter was defined by ἐντελέχεια, *but it seems to be another kind of Soul, and that onely is separable from the Body, as that which is Eternal and Immortal from that which is Corruptible. But the other Powers or Parts of the Soul (viz. the Vegetative and Sensitive) are not separable, καθάπερ φασὶ τινες, as some*
 20 *think*. Where by these [τινες some] which he here refutes, he manifestly

1–2 εἰ ἔστι τὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον] “If there be any of the functions or affections of the soul peculiar to it”; adapted slightly from *de anima*, I.1. 403a.

7 ἔνυλοι λόγοι] “forms realised in matter”; *de anima*, I.1.403a.

12–13 περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως, οὐδέπω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι,] “But as regards intellect and the speculative faculty the case is not yet clear. It would seem, however, to be a distinct species of soul...”; *de anima*, II.2.413b

19 καθάπερ φασὶ τινες,] “as some allege”; *de anima*, II.2.413b.

parts should not be separated, if they are *not the actualities of any body whatsoever*(my emphasis).”

1 those Three books] of *de anima*.

5–6 all *Sensations* and *Passions* arise as well from the *Body* as from the *Soul*] For Aristotle’s view that “all the affections of the soul are associated with the body”, see *de anima*, I.1.403a.

9 *inseparable* from the *Body*] As at *de anima*, I.1.403b.

12–13 περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως, οὐδέπω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι,] The passage continues: “and it alone is capable of separation from the body as that which is eternal from that which is perishable. The remaining parts of the soul are, as the foregoing consideration shows, not separable in the way that some allege them to be:”

20 these [τινες some] which] Again, the square brackets represent Worthington’s clarification.

means the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans*, who held that all kinds of Souls were immortal, as well the Souls of beasts as of men; whereas he upon that former enquire concluded that nothing was immortal, but that which is the Seat of Reason and Understanding: and so his meaning is, that this

5 Rational Soul is altogether a distinct Essence from those other; or else that glory which he makes account he reaps from his supposed victory over the other Sects of Philosophers will be much eclipsed, seeing they themselves did not so much contend for that which he decries, *viz.* an exercise of any such *Informative faculties* in a state of Separation, neither

10 doe we find them much more to reject one part of that complex Axiome of his τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ νοῦς χωριστὸς, *That which is sensitive is not without the Body, but the Intellect or Mind is separable*, then they doe the other.

The other difficulty which *Aristotle's* opinion seems to be clogg'd withal

15 is that Conclusion which he laies down *lib.3.c.5.* ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς, φθαρτὸς, which is commonly thus expounded, *Intellectus patiens est corruptibilis*. But all this difficulty will soon be cleared, if once it may appear how

11 τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ νοῦς χωριστὸς] “the perceptive faculty is not independent of body, whereas intellect is separable”; *de anima*, III.4. 429b.

15–16 ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς, φθαρτὸς] “but the intellect which can be affected is perishable”; *de anima*, III.4. 430a.; for Cudworth's use of the citation, see Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.55

16–17 *Intellectus patiens est corruptibilis*] “the passive intellect is corruptible”

1–2 who held that all kinds of Souls were immortal, as well the Souls of beasts as of men] For Diogenes Laertius' report of Pythagoras' belief that “Soul is distinct from life; it is immortal, since that from which it is detached is immortal”, see *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VIII, 27; and for his testimony that Pythagoras “forbade even the killing, let alone the eating, of animals which share with us the privilege of having a soul”, see VIII, 13. For further reading on Pythagoras, see Guthrie, *The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library*; a brief survey of Pythagorean beliefs about the soul is in Heninger, *Touches of Sweet Harmony: Pythagorean Cosmology and Renaissance Poetics*, pp.266ff.

16–17 *Intellectus patiens est corruptibilis*] cf., for example, Averroes' “intellectus passibilis est corruptibilis” (*In de anima*, 163a); St Thomas Aquinas' “intellectus si est passivus, est corruptibilis, ut dicitur in III de anima” (*Summa Theologiae*, I.79.1.2.) The entry for “intellectus” in Cassin et al., *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon*, pp.490ff. is helpful here.

ridiculous their conceit is, that from that Chapter fetch that idle distinction of *Intellectus Agens & Patiens*; meaning by the *Agens*, that which prepares phantasmes, and exalts them into the nature of intelligible *species*, and then propounds them to the *Patiens* to judge thereof: whereas indeed he
 5 means nothing else by his νοῦς παθητικὸς, but onely the Understanding *in potentia*, and by his νοῦς ποιητικὸς, the same *in actu* or *in habitu*, as the Schoolmen are wont to phrase it; and accordingly thus laies down his meaning and method of this notion. In the preceding Chapter of that
 10 Book, he disputes against *Plato's* Connate *species*, as being afraid, lest if the Soul should be prejudiced by any home-born notions, it would not be indifferent to the entertaining of any other Truth. Where, by the way, we may observe how unreasonable his Argument is: for if the Soul hath no such stock of principles to trade with, nor any proper notions of its own

1–2 that idle distinction of *Intellectus Agens & Patiens*] “active intellect” and “passive intellect”

5 νοῦς παθητικὸς] “intellect which can be affected”, “intellectus patiens”

6 *in potentia*] “in its potential state”

6 νοῦς ποιητικὸς] “creative intellect”; cf. *de anima*, III.5.430a.

6 *in actu*] “in its actual state”

6 *in habitu*] “in its habitual state”; based on *de anima*, III.4.429b

1 that Chapter] *de anima*, III.5.

1–2 that idle distinction of *Intellectus Agens & Patiens*] cf. “to make this *intellectus agens* and *patiens* only the various aspects and different relations of the same is but a weak and needless device” in Culverwel, *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature*, p.107; see also the discussions in Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.55f, and Culverwel, *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature*, p.68. For a brief discussion of Smith’s and Culverwel’s views of Averroes, see Akasoy and Giglioni, *Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe*, p.202f.

4 he] i.e. Aristotle, of course.

6 *in habitu*] “When a man progresses to the level where he has learned the first principles of thought but is not actually thinking them at the moment, he has attained the stage of intellect *in habitu*”. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes On Intellect*, p. 94., referring to Avicenna’s use of the term. cf. Whichcote, *Works*, II, p.4.

7 the Schoolmen] i.e. scholastics

8–9 the preceding Chapter of that Book] *de anima*, III.4.

9 he disputes against *Plato's* Connate *species*] For Aristotle’s view that the mind “has no other nature than this, that it is a capacity” and that “the part of the soul which we call intellect (and by intellect I mean that whereby the soul thinks and conceives) is nothing at all actually before it thinks”, see *de anima* III.4.429a. See also the discussion in Culverwel, *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature*, pp.73ff.

that might be a κριτήριον of all Opinions, it would be so indifferent to any, that the foulest Errour might be as easily entertained by it as the fairest Truth; neither could it ever know what guest it receives, whether Truth, or Falshood. But yet our Author found himself able to swallow down this absurdity, though when he had done he could not well digest it. For he could not but take notice of that which was obvious for any one to reply, That πᾶς νοῦς ἐστὶ νοητὸς, and so reflecting upon it self, may find matter within to work upon; and so laies down this scruple in a way not much different from his Masters, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητὸς ἐστὶ, ὥσπερ τὰ νοητὰ, &c. *but the Soul it self is also intelligible, as well as all other natures are; and in those Beings which are purely abstracted from Matter, that which understands is the same with that which is understood.* Thus he. But not being Master of this notion, he finds it a little too unruly for him, and falls to enquire why the Soul should not then alwaies be *in actu*; quitting himself of the whole difficulty at once by telling us, that our souls are here clogg'd with a *Hyle* or *Matter* that cleaves to them, and so all the matter of their knowledge is contained in sensible objects, which they must extract out of them, being themselves onely ἐν δυνάμει or *in potentia ad intelligendum*. Just as in a like argument (Chap.8.) he would needs perswade us; That the Understanding beholds all things in the glass of Phansie; and then questioning how our πρῶτα νοήματα or *First principles of knowledge* should be *Phant-*

1 κριτήριον] “means of judging or trying”; cf. Plato, *Theaetetus*, 178b.

7 πᾶς νοῦς ἐστὶ νοητὸς] “the whole mind falls within the province of thought”; adapted from *de anima*, III.4.429b.

9 καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητὸς ἐστὶ, ὥσπερ τὰ νοητὰ,] “and the mind itself is included among the objects which can be thought”; *de anima*, III.4.430a.

18 ἐν δυνάμει] “in a potential state”

18 *in potentia ad intelligendum*] “in a potential state to understand”; the Latin translation of the previous phrase.

21 πρῶτα νοήματα] “first thoughts”; *de anima*, III.8.432a.

9 his Masters] Plato and his predecessors.

9 καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητὸς ἐστὶ, ὥσπερ τὰ νοητὰ,] Aristotle continues: “For where the objects are immaterial that which thinks and that which is thought are identical. Speculative knowledge and its object are identical.”

15 *Hyle*] From ὕλη, the primal Aristotelean matter from which the four elements arose.

16–17 all the matter of their knowledge is contained in sensible objects, which they must extract out of them] cf. “no one could ever learn or understand anything without the exercise of sense perception” in *de anima*, III.8.432a.

21 πρῶτα νοήματα] In the sense of primary or simple concepts.

asmes, he grants that they are not indeed *phantasmes*, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων, but yet they are not without *phantasmes*; which he thinks is enough to say, and so by his meer dictate without any further discussion to solve that knot: whereas in all *Reflex acts*, whereby the Soul reviews
 5 its own opinions, and finds out the nature of them, it makes neither use of Sense or *Phantasmes*, but acting immediately by its own power, finds it self ἀσώματον καὶ χωριστὴν σωμάτων, as *Simplicius* observes.

But to return, This *Hyle* or *Matter* which our Author supposeth to hinder a free & uninterrupted exercise of Understanding, is indeed nothing else
 10 but the Souls *potentiality*; and not any kind of divisible or extended nature. And therefore when he thus distinguisheth between his *Intellectus Agens* and *Patiens*, he seems to mean almost nothing else but what our ordinary Metaphysitians doe in their distinction of *Actus* and *Potentia*, (as *Simplicius* hath truly observed) when they tell us, that the finest created nature
 15 is made up of these two compounded together. For we must know that the *genius* of his Philosophy led him to fancy an ὑποκείμενον τι, a certain subject or obediential power in every thing that fell with the compass of Physical speculation, or that had any relation to any natural body; and some other power which was εἰδοποιούν, that was of an active and operating nature:
 20 and consequently that both these Principles were in the Soul it self, which as it was capable of receiving impressions & *species* from the Phansie, and in a *posse* to understand, so it was *Passive*; but as

1–2 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων] “but they are not without images”; *de anima*, III.8.432a.
 7 ἀσώματον καὶ χωριστὴν σωμάτων] “unbodied and separable from body”; *Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s de anima*, 7.23, commenting on *de anima* I.1, 402a.

13 *Actus* and *Potentia*] “action and potentiality”; scholastic terms translating Aristotle’s ἐντελέχεια and δυνάμεις.

13–14 (as *Simplicius* hath truly observed)] presumably in the *Commentary on Aristotle’s de anima*; find it.

16 ὑποκείμενον τι,] “some underlying foundation”; cf. *de anima*, II.1.412a, II.2.413a.

19 εἰδοποιούν,] “that which gives something its form or nature”; perhaps a term owing more to *Simplicius* than to Aristotle; cf. *Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics*, 454.16, commenting on *physica*, 202b.

21 *species*] “appearance”, “outward form”

22 *posse*] “potentiality”

12–13 our ordinary Metaphysitians] Perhaps referring to contemporary scholastic thinkers, such as Suárez and Robert Bellarmine.

it doth actually understand, so it is ποιητικὸς or *Active*. And with this Notion he begins his 5. Chap. Ἐπει δὲ ὡσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι, τὸ μὲν ὅλη ἐκάστῳ γένει, &c. that is *Seeing that in every nature there is something which as a First subject is all things potentially, and some Active principle*
 5 *which produceth all things, as Art doth in Matter; it is necessary that the Soul also partake of these differences.* And this he illustrates by *Light & Colours*; resembling the *Passive* power of the Intellect to *Colours*, the *Active* or *Energetical* to *Light*: and therefore he saies, *it is χωρίτος, καὶ ἀμιγῆς, καὶ ἀπαθὴς, separable, unmixt, and impassible*; and so at last concludes,
 10 *χωρισθεὶς δὲ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, in the state of separation this Intellect is alwaies that which it is* (that is, alwaies *Active and Energetical*, as he had told us before, *τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνέργεια, the essence of it being activity*) καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων, οὐ μνημονεύομεν δὲ ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθὲς *and this onely is immortal and eternal, but we doe not remember*
 15 *because it is impassible.* In which last words he seems to disprove *Plato's Remiscentia*, because the Soul in a state of Separation being alwaies

1 ποιητικὸς] “productive”, “capable of making”; cf. *de anima*, III.5.430a.

2–3 Ἐπει δὲ ὡσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι, τὸ μὲν ὅλη ἐκάστῳ γένει, &c.] “Since, just as in all of nature there is something which is matter to each kind of thing”; *de anima*, III.5.430.

8–9 χωρίτος, καὶ ἀμιγῆς, καὶ ἀπαθὴς] “separable and unmixed and impassive”; *de anima*, III.5.430.

10 χωρισθεὶς δὲ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ] “It is only when separated that it is its true self”; *de anima*, III.5.430a.

12 τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνέργεια] “being in its essential nature an activity”; *de anima*, III.5.430a.

13–14 καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων, οὐ μνημονεύομεν δὲ ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθὲς] “and this alone is immortal and eternal, but we do not remember because this is impassive”; *de anima*, III.5.430a.

2–3 Ἐπει δὲ ὡσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι, τὸ μὲν ὅλη ἐκάστῳ γένει, &c.] Aristotle continues: “(and this is potentially all the members of the kind) there corresponds something else which is the cause or agent because it makes them all, the two being related to one another as art to its material, of necessity these differences must be found also in the soul.”

15–16 *Plato's Remiscentia*] cf. *Phaedo* 76, *Phaedrus* 250, *Meno* 280 seq. etc; Cudworth explains: “And this is the only true and allowable Sense of that Old Assertion, that Knowledge is Reminiscence, not that it is the Remembrance of something which the Soul had some time before Actually Known in a Pre-existence State; but because it is the Mind's comprehending of things by Some Inward Anticipations of it own, Something Native and Domestick to it, or Something actively exerted from within it self.” Cudworth, *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, p.129.

in act, the *Passive* power of it, which then first begins to appear when it is embodied, could not represent or contain any such Traditional *species* as the *Energeticall* faculty acted upon before; seeing there was then no Phansie to retain them in, as *Simplicius* expounds it, διὸ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν μνημενευτῶν νοήσει, δεόμεθα πάντως τοῦ μέχει φαντασίας προϊόντος λόγου ,
 5 because in all remembrance we must reflect upon our Phansie. And this our Author seems to glance at, it being indeed never out of his eye, in these words we have endeavoured to give an account of ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτὸς, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ, *But the Passive intellect is corruptible, and without this we can understand nothing in this life.* And thus our
 10 forenamed Commentator doubts not to glosse on them.

We have now done with the Confirmation of this Point, which is the main *Basis* of all Religion, and shall not at present trouble our selves with those difficulties that may seem to incumber it; which indeed are onely
 15 such as beg for a Solution, but doe not, if they be impartially considered, proudly contest with it: and such of them which depend upon any *hypothesis* which we may apprehend to be lai'd down in *Scripture*, I cannot think them to be of any such moment, but that any one who deals freely and ingenuously with this piece of God's truth, may from thence find a far
 20 better *ansa* of answering, then he can of moving of any scruples against

4–5 διὸ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν μνημενευτῶν νοήσει, δεόμεθα πάντως τοῦ μέχει φαντασίας προϊόντος λόγου] “because in the act of knowing by remembering, in every respect, we need some images for knowledge to proceed”; *Commentary on Aristotle's de anima*, 248, 8–9, commenting on *de anima* III.5, 430a.

8–9 ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτὸς, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ] “But the intellect which can be affected is perishable and without this does not think at all”; *de anima*, III.5, 430a. See above p.213.

20 *ansa*] “opportunity”, “something that can be grasped”

7 our Author] i.e. Aristotle.

10–11 our forenamed Commentator] *Simplicius*. This sentence seems to mark the end of Smith's digression.

11 to glosse on them] cf. “And as it were objecting to the soul having been shown to be everlasting, he [Aristotle] asks how we do not remember things before birth if it had previously existed everlastingly. ... And the solution to the objection is appropriate to soul ... the impassible intellect clearly thinks none of the things that can be remembered” in *Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's de anima*, 248, 1ff., commenting on *de anima* III.5, 430a.

16 contest with it] i.e. with the immortality of the soul.

the Souls Immortality, which that most strongly every where supposes, & does not so positively & ῥητῶς lay down, as presume that we have an antecedent knowledge of it, & therefore principally teaches us the right Way & Method of providing in this life for our happy subsistence in that eternal estate. And as for what pretend to *Reason* or *Experience*, I think it may not be amiss briefly to search into one main difficulty concerning the Soul's Immortality: and that is, That strange kind of dependency which it seems to have on the Body, whereby it seems constantly to comply and sympathize therewith, and to assume to it self the frailties and infirmities thereof, to laugh and languish as it were together with that: and so when the Body is compos'd to rest, our Soul seems to sleep together with it; and as the Spring of bodily Motion seated in our Brains is more clear or muddy, so the conceptions of our Minds are more distinct or disturbed.

To answer this difficulty, it might be enough perhaps to say, That the *Sympathy* of things is no sufficient Argument to prove the *Identity* of their essences by, as I think all will grant; yet we shall endeavour more fully to solve it.

And for that purpose we must take notice, that though our Souls be of an Incorporeal nature, as we have already demonstrated, yet they are united to our Bodies, not as *Assisting forms* or *Intelligences*, as some have thought, but in some more immediate way; though we cannot tell what that is, it being the great *arcanum* in Man's nature, that which troubled *Plotinus* so much, when he had contemplated the *Immortality* of it, that, as he speaks of himself, *Enn.4.lib.8.c.1.* εἰς λογισμὸν ἀπὸ νοῦ καταβάς, ἀπο-

2 ῥητῶς] "specifically", "explicitly"

22 *arcanum*] "sacred mystery"

24–2 εἰς λογισμὸν ἀπὸ νοῦ καταβάς, ἀπορῶ πῶς ποτε καὶ νῦν καταβίνω, καὶ ὅπως ποτέ μοι ἔνδον ἢ ψυχῇ γεγένηται τοῦ σώματος, τοῦτο οὐσα οἶόν ἐφάνη καθ' ἑαυτὴν, καὶ περ οὐσα ἐν σώματι] "when I have come down from Intellect to discursive reasoning, I am puzzled how I ever came down, and how my soul has come to be in the body when it is what it has shown itself to be by itself, even when it is in the body"; *Enneads*, IV.8.1.; continuing from the previous quotation, cited before the "digression".

12 the Spring of bodily Motion seated in our Brains] Note that the metaphor is not mechanical, but natural.

20–21 as some have thought] As, for example, Averroes and his followers.

22 *arcanum*] Not necessarily in an esoteric sense: Smith owned Clapmarius, *De Arcanis Rerumpublicarum Libri Sex*.

ρῶ πῶς ποτε καὶ νῦν καταβίνω, καὶ ὅπως ποτέ μοι ἔνδον ἢ ψυχὴ γεγένηται τοῦ
 σώματος, τοῦτο οὕσα οἶον ἐφάνη καθ' ἑαυτὴν, καὶ περ οὕσα ἐν σώματι. But
 indeed to make such a *Complex* thing as Man is, it was necessary that
 the *Soul* should be so united to the *Body*, as to share in its passions and
 5 infirmities so far as they are void of sinfulness. And as the *Body* alone
 could not perform any act of Sensation or Reason, and so it self become
 a ζῶον πολιτικόν, so neither would the *Soul* be capable of providing for the
 necessities of the *Body* without some way whereby a feeling and sense
 of them might be conveyed to it; neither could it take sufficient care of
 10 this corporeal life, as nothing pertaining to it, were it not sollicited to a
 natural compunction and compassion by the indigencies of our Bodies. It
 cannot be a meer Mental Speculation that would be so sensibly affected
 with hunger or cold or other griefs that our Bodies necessarily partake of,
 to move our Souls to take care for their relief: and were there not such a
 15 commerce between our Souls and Bodies, as that our Souls also might
 be made acquainted by a pleasurable and delightful sense of those things
 that most gratifie our Bodies, and tend most to the support of their *Crisis*
 and temperament; the Soul would be apt wholly to neglect the *Body*, and
 commit it wholly to all changes and casualties. Neither would it be any
 20 thing more to us then the body of a Plant or a Star, which we contemplate
 sometimes with as much contentment as we do our own bodies, having
 as much of the Theory of the one as of the other. And the relation that our
 Souls bear to such peculiar bodies as they inhabite is one and the same
 in point of notion and speculation with that which they have to any other
 25 body: and therefore that which determines the Soul to this *Body* more
 then that, must be some subtile *vinculum* that knits and unites it to it in a
 more Physical way, which sometimes therefore Proclus calls πνευματικόν

31 ζῶον πολιτικόν] “social being”, capable of living in society.

41 *Crisis*] “*Crisis*, (Gr.) is a convenient Mixture of Qualities in an Animal Body” Blount, *Glossographia*

51–1 πνευματικόν ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς] “the pneumatic vehicle of the soul”; adapted from Proclus, *Commentary on the Timaeus*, 312a; Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, III, p.237.

31 ζῶον πολιτικόν] Often translated as “political animal”, the phrase originates in Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.1253a, but Smith may have in mind its use in Plotinus, *Enneads*, III.4.2.

47 peculiar] “*Peculiar*, particular, or singular” Blount, *Glossographia*.

50 *vinculum*] “a bond of union,; a tie” (OED, citing Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe* as the first occurrence.

ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς, *a spiritual kind of vehicle*, whereby corporeal impressions are transferr'd to the Mind, and the dictates and decrees of that are carried back again to the Body to act and move it. *Heraclitus* wittily glancing at these mutual aspects and entercourses, calls them ἀμοιβὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, the Responsals or Antiphons wherein each of them catcheth at the others part & keeps time with it; and so he tells us that there is ὁδὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω, *a way that leads upwards and downwards* between the *Soul* and *Body*, whereby their affairs are made known to one another. For as the Soul could not have a sufficient relation of the state and condition of our Bodies, except it received some impressions from them; so neither could our Souls make use of our Bodies, or derive their own virtue into them as they doe, without some intermediate motions. For as some motions may seem to have their beginning in our Bodies, or in some external mover, which are not known by our Souls till their advertency be awakened by the impetuosity of them : so some other motions are derived by our own Wills into our Bodies, but yet in such a way as they cannot be into any other body; for we cannot by the meer Magical virtue of our Wills move any thing else without our selves, nor follow any such virtue by a concurrent sense of those mutations that are made by it, as we doe in our own Bodies.

And as this Conjugal affection and sympathy between Soul and Body are thus necessary to the Being of Mankind; so we may further take notice of *some peculiar part* within us where all this first begins: which a late sagacious Philosopher hath happily observed to be in that part of the

55–56 ἀμοιβὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων] “necessary changes from the opposite”; if anything, the implied metaphor is of changing clothes, rather than musical responses; Smith is quoting from *Enneads*, IV.8.1.

58 ὁδὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω] “a way up and down”; again, Smith quotes from *Enneads*, IV.8.1.; on Heraclitus’ sayings, see Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, pp. 109, 11, 114-6, 123-7, 129-30.

72 Conjugal affection] A metaphor which Smith continues below.

74–75 a late sagacious Philosopher] Descartes. See Saveson, “Descartes’ Influence on John Smith, Cambridge Platonist”. Smith’s copy of Descartes, *Les passions de l’âme* is still in Queens’.

75–2 in that part of the Brain from whence all those Nerves that conduct the Animal spirits up and down the Body take their first Original] i.e. the pineal gland; for Descartes’ description, see Descartes, *The Passions of the Soule*, l.31, pp.25-6. Among recent

Brain from whence all those Nerves that conduct the Animal spirits up and down the Body take their first Original; seeing we find all Motions that first arise in our Bodies, to direct their course straight up to that, as continually respecting it, and there onely to be sensated, and all the imperate motions
 5 of our Wills issuing forth from the same consistory. Therefore the Animal spirits, by reason of their constant mobility and swift motion, ascending to the place of our Nerves origination, move the Soul, which there sits enthron'd, in some mysterious way; and descending at the beck of our Wills from thence, move all the Muscles and joynts in such sort as they
 10 are guided and directed by the Soul. And if we observe the subtile Mechanicks of our own Bodies, we may easily conceive how the least motion in these Animal Spirits will, by their relaxing or distending the Nerves, Membranes and Muscles, according to their different quantity or the celerity and quality of their motions, beget all kind of motions likewise in the Or-
 15 ganical part of our Bodies. And therefore that our Souls may the better inform our Bodies, they must perceive all their varieties; and because they have such an immediate proximity to these Spirits, therefore also all the Motions of Souls in the highest way of Reason and Understanding are apt to stir these quick and nimble spirits alwaies attending upon them, or else
 20 fix them too much. And thus we may easily see that should our Souls be alwaies acting and working within us, our Bodies could never take that rest and repose which is requisite for the conservation of Nature. As

76 conduct] in the sense of "provide a channel for".

80–90 Therefore the Animal spirits ... part of our Bodies] Summarising Descartes, *The Passions of the Soule*, I.34, pp.28-29.

accounts of Cartesian physiology, see Ochs, *A History of Nerve Functions: From Animal Spirits to Molecular Mechanisms*, pp.64ff. and C. Smith, *The Animal Spirit Doctrine and the Origins of Neurophysiology*, pp.102ff.

79 imperate] see above, p. 189

80 consistory] "the Court Christian, or Spiritual Court, held formerly in the the Nave of the Cathedral Church, or some Chappel, Isle or Portico belonging to it, in which the Bishop presided, and had some of his Clergy for Assessors and Assistants." Blount, *Glossographia*.

83 enthron'd, in some mysterious way] Smith's metaphor and emphasis

83–84 at the beck of our Wills] Smith and Descartes are both anxious to preserve freedom of will: cf. "the will is so free by nature, that it can never be constrained ... and all the Action of the Soul consists in this, that she meerly by willing any thing can make the little kerneal whereunto she is strictly joynd, move in the manner requisie to produce the effect relating to this Will." Descartes, *The Passions of the Soule*, I.41, pp.33-4.

we may easily perceive in all our studies and meditations that are most serious, our Spirits are the more fix'd, attending the beck of our Minds. And except this knot whereby our Souls are wedded to our Bodies were unloosed that our Souls were loose from them, they could not act, but
 5 presently some Motion or other would be imprest upon our Bodies: as every Motion in our Bodies that is extraordinary, when our Nerves are distended with the Animal spirits, by a continual communication of it self in these Nerves like so many intended Chords to their original, moves our Souls; and so though we alwaies perceive that one of them is primarily
 10 affected, yet also we find the other presently by consent to be affected too.

And because the Soul hath all Corporeal passions and impressions thus conveyed to it, without which it could not expresse a due benevolence to that Body which peculiarly belongs to it; therefore as the Motions
 15 of these Animal Spirits are more or less either disorderly and confused, or gentle and compos'd, so those Souls especially who have not by the exercise of true Vertue got the dominion over them, are also more or less affected proportionably in their operations. And therefore indeed to question whether the Soul, that is of an Immortal nature, should entertain these
 20 corporeal passions, is to doubt whether God could make a Man or not, and to question that which we find by experience in our selves; for we find both that it doth thus, and yet that the Original of these is sometimes from Bodies, and sometimes again by the force of our Wills they are impress'd upon our Bodies.

8 intended Chords] in the sense of "extended" or "strained" cords.

3 this knot whereby our Souls are wedded to our Bodies] cf. Cudworth, *The true intellectual system of the Universe*, p.160: "That *Vital Sympathy*, by which our Soul is united and tied fast, as it were with a Knot, to the Body, is a thing that we have no direct *Consciousness* of, but only in its Effects."

8 intended Chords] The phrase may reflect a Cartesian idea: "the animal spirits, which being conveyed through these very pipes from the brain to the muscles, are the cause that these threds remain there entirely unmolested, and extended in such a manner, that the least thing that moves that part of the body, whereunto the extremity of any one of them is fastned, doth by the same reason move that part of the brain from when it comes; just as when a man pulls at one end of a string, he causeth the other end to stirre" in Descartes, *The Passions of the Soule*, I.12, pp. 11-12. However, Smith's cords are sympathetic strings, resonating in "consent" with their "original".

up and down in our *Brains*, and swiftly flie up and down our whole Bodies, we presently find our Phansies raised with *mirth* and *chearfulness*: and when our Phansies are thus exalted, we may not call this the *Energy of Grace*; so if our *Spleen* or *Hypochondria*, swelling with terrene and sluggish vapours, send up such *Melancholick* fumes into our heads as move us to *sadness* and *timorousness*, we cannot justly call that *Vice*; nor when the *Gall* does degurgitate its bitter juyce into our *Liver*, which mingling it self with the blood, begets *fiery* Spirits that presently fly up into our Brain, and there beget impressions of *Anger* within us. The like we may say of those Corporeal passions which are not bred first of all by any Peccant humours or distemperatures in our own bodies, but are excited in us by any External objects which by those *idola* and images that they present to our Senses, or rather those Motions they make in them, may presently raise such commotions in our Spirits: For our Body maintains not onely a conspiracy and consent of all its own parts, but also it bears a like relation to other mundane bodies with which it is conversant, as being a part of the whole Universe. But when our Soul, once mov'd by the undisciplin'd petulancy of our Animal spirits, shall foment and cherish that Irrational Grief, Fear, Anger, Love, or any other such like Passions contrary to the dictates of Reason; it then sets the stamp of sinfulness upon them. It is the consent of our own Wills that by brooding of them brings forth those hatefull Serpents. For though our Souls be espoused to these Earthly Bodies, and cannot but in some measure sympathize with them, yet hath the Soul a true dominion of its own acts. It is not the meer passion, if we take it in a Physicall sense, but rather some inordinate actions of our own Wills that entertain it: and these passions cannot force our Wills, but we may be able to chastise and allay the inordinacy of them by the power of our Wills and Reasons and therefore God hath not made us under the necessity of sin, by making us men subject to such infirmities as these are which are meerly ζωαὶ σωμαίων, as the Greek Philosopher

30 ζωαὶ σωμαίων] “the life of the body”; Simplicius, *Commentary on Epictetus*, 1.1.; H. Wolf, *Simplicii Commentarius In Enchiridion Epicteti: Ex Libris veteribus emendatus*, p.8.; cf. “Now the irrational desires ... are to a large extent moved externally, since they

7 degurgitate] “evacuate from the stomach”; HGW’s emendation (“pour forth”) misses the anatomical reference altogether.

10 Peccant] “*Peccant*. (Lat.) Sinning; also those Humours of the Body, which contain some malignity, or which are too Exuberant are called *Peccant*.” Blount, *Glossographia*
30 the Greek Philosopher] Usually Plotinus, here Simplicius.

hath well called them, *the blossomings and shootings forth of bodily life within us*; which is but τὸ ἀνθρώπινον or Humanity.

And, if I mistake not, our Divinity is wont sometimes to acknowledge some such thing in our Saviour himself, who was in all things made like to us, our sinfulness excepted. He was *a man of sorrows and acquainted with griefs*, as the Prophet *Esay* speaks of him : and when he was in bodily agonies and horrors, the powerfull assaults thereof upon his Soul moved him to petition his Father, that if it were possible, that bitter *cup might pass from him*; and the sense of death so much afflicted him, that it bred in him the sad *griefs* which S. *Peter* expresseth by ὠδῖνας τοῦ θανάτου Act. 2. *the pangs or throes of death*, and that *fear* that extorted a *desire* to be freed from it, as it is insinuated by that in Heb.5.7. *he was delivered from what he feared*; for so the words, being nothing else but an Hebraism, are to be rendred, εἰσακουθεὶς ἀπο τῆς εὐλαβείας. And we are wont to call this *the language and dictate of Nature* which lawfully endeavours to preserve it self, though presently an *higher principle* must bring all these under a subjection to God, and a free submission to his good pleasure: as it was with our Saviour, who moderated all these passions by a ready resignation of himself and his own Will up to the Will of God; and though his Humanity crav'd for ease and relaxation, yet that Divine Nature that was within him would not have it with any repugnancy to the supreme Will of God.

are contiguous to the body and are lives of the body, and so seem to spring from the composition of the bodies” Brittain and Brennan, *Simplicius: On Epictetus Handbook 1-26*, p. 41 and note, p. 126.

2 τὸ ἀνθρώπινον] “being human”

5–6 *a man of sorrows and acquainted with griefs*] Isaiah, 53,3: “He is despised and reiected of men, a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grieve: and we hid as it were our faces from him; hee was despised, and wee esteemed him not.”

8–9 bitter *cup might pass from him*] Matthew 26, 39: “And he went a little further, and fell on his face, and prayed, saying, O my father, if it be possible, let this cup passe from me: neuerthesse, not as I will, but as thou wilt.”; cf. Matthew 26,42

10 ὠδῖνας τοῦ θανάτου] “agony of death”

11 Act. 2. *the pangs or throes of death*] Acts 2, 24: “Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the pains of death: because it was not possible that he should be holden of it.”

12–13 Heb.5.7. *he was delivered from what he feared*] Hebrews 5,7: “Who in the days of his flesh, when he had offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto him that was able to save him from death, and was heard in that he feared;”

14 εἰσακουθεὶς ἀπο τῆς εὐλαβείας] lit. “having been heard in his reverent submission”